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ARTICLES

It’s Not About the Money:
THE ROLE OF PREFERENCES, COGNITIVE BIASES,
AND HEURISTICS AMONG PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES
Michael A. McCann†
I.

INTRODUCTION

Professional athletes are often regarded as selfish,
greedy, and out-of-touch with regular people. They hire agents
who are vilified for negotiating employment contracts that
occasionally yield compensation in excess of national gross
domestic products.1 Professional athletes are thus commonly
assumed to most value economic remuneration, rather than the
“love of the game” or some other intangible, romanticized
inclination.
Lending credibility to this intuition is the rational actor
model; a law and economic precept which presupposes that
when individuals are presented with a set of choices, they
rationally weigh costs and benefits, and select the course of
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Scholar/Researcher at Harvard Law School and a member of the legal team for former
Ohio State football player Maurice Clarett in his lawsuit against the National Football
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1
In the extreme example, consider the ten-year, $252 million contract Alex
Rodriguez signed with the Texas Rangers in 2002. $252 million represents eleven
times the value of North Korea’s Gross Domestic Product. See John Blanchette, But
It’s Baseball That Is the Real Loser in This Absurd Deal, SPOKESMAN REV., Dec. 12,
2000, at C1.
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action that maximizes their wealth, happiness, or satisfaction.2
Since athletes are generally presumed to most value financial
compensation, they simply behave “rationally” by selecting the
most lucrative offer.
Intriguingly, however, for every apparent athletic
mercenary, there appear to be many who significantly discount
financial compensation. Indeed, for a variety of expressed
motivations, professional athletes regularly select the nonoptimal contract offer, at least in the traditional sense of
optimality. Risk aversion and other deliberative strategies
occasionally provide an explanation, but more often, the reason
lies in intangibles, such as loyalty, regional affinity, weather
preferences, familiarity with certain teammates or coaches,
prospects for team success, and demographic traits.
A law and economic explanation for such behavior
would illuminate the ranking of alternative preferences, and
then, as reflected by choice, a maximization of such ranking.
Put differently, by accepting a less remunerative offer,
professional athletes may consciously substitute subjective
value for objective value, and their choice simply reflects that
which makes them most happy.
Though diagrammatic in many instances, preferences
may not universally explain decision-making among
professional athletes. Indeed, like all individuals, professional
athletes appear vulnerable to cognitive biases, which are
subconscious
mental errors
triggered
by
simplified
informational processes, and heuristics, which are convenient,
if unfinished predictive cues. Though cognitive biases and
heuristics enable individuals to manage a complex array of
stimuli, they often distort preferences and adversely affect
decision-making. For instance, because of confirmation bias,
individuals are subject to ignore or discount information that
challenges existing beliefs. Alternatively, optimism bias leads
individuals to assume that general risks do not apply with
equal force to themselves.
In the context of professional sports, these and other
cognitive distortions may impair not only the pursuit of
objective value, but also rational assessment of subjective
value. This is especially true when teams adroitly manipulate
distortions, such as impressing illusory variances among
2
See Peter A. Alces, “If You Don’t Have Anything Good to Say . . . .,” 15
BANKR. DEV. J. 383, 409, 411-12 (1999) (reviewing KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND
FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM (1997)).
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themselves and other teams. Accordingly, when accepting a
less remunerative offer, professional athletes may have
unknowingly misinterpreted their preferences and rankings.
To date, no published analysis has addressed the
potential influence of behavioral tendencies on professional
athletes in contemplation of contract offers. Perhaps this is not
surprising, given the relative paucity of professional athletes
among the general population, their presumptively unique
modes of employment, and a general aversion among
academics to the study of sports.
A more scrupulous
assessment of professional athletes, however, suggests a
uniquely desirable group for examination. Indeed, aside from
their striking influence on the world and economy around
them, professional athletes, unlike most groups commonly
studied by academics, furnish published commentary of their
thought processes, typically through newspaper, television, and
radio interviews. Accordingly, professional athletes offer a
wealth of narration as to their values, beliefs, and priorities,
and, equally important, such narration occurs in real world
settings, rather than in experimental circumstances. Along
those lines, by evading the alleged “experimental flaw” of many
behavioral law and economic studies, analysis of decisionmaking among professional athletes may prove extraordinarily
salient in the broader discussion of behavioral sciences and
their influence on traditional law and economics.
In pursuit of the above phenomena, this Article will
begin by exploring the rational actor model and how
individuals utilize preferences in determining their optimal
choice. This Article will then discuss limitations to the rational
actor model, namely the role of cognitive biases and heuristics.
Thereafter, this Article will canvass decision-making among
professional athletes in contemplation of contract offers. In
that regard, this Article will examine why some professional
athletes pursue the most lucrative offer, while others do not,
and to what extent cognitive biases and heuristics influence
their decision-making.
This Article will conclude by
highlighting implications for professional sports and proposing
recommendations for further analysis by economists,
psychologists, and legal academics.
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II.

EXPLORING THE RATIONAL ACTOR MODEL IN
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS

A.

Choice and Utility Among Rational Actors

[Vol. 71:4

In assessing explanations for why individuals choose
one option over another, many theories have emerged. In the
context of economic activity, the rational choice theory has
received particular praise for its alleged ability to predict
human behavior.3 It posits that individuals are selfish actors
who seek maximum utility, and when presented with a set of
alternatives, select the alternative offering greatest utility.4
Utility may embody objective ends, such as material wealth or
tangible property.5 It may also comprise subjective goals, such
as happiness or satisfaction.6 Irrespective of its characteristics,
utility is thought to demand a set of preferences that
encourages a particular behavior, namely the satisfaction of
utility-driven preferences in the most efficient manner.7 Put
differently, “rationality” consists of pursuing preferences at
minimal cost.8
While in search of maximum utility, rational actors are
presumed to embody only “selfish” interests.9 Rational choice
theorists contend that pursuit of selfish interests promotes
cooperation with other persons. Such a contention is partly
deduced from the scholarship of Robert Axelrod, who, in The
3
See, e.g., Mark R. Brown, Deterring Bully Government: A Sovereign
Dilemma, 76 TUL. L. REV. 149, 160 n.59 (2001); Ronald A. Cass, Economics and
International Law, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 473, 509 n.114 (1997); Richard H.
Pildes, The Destruction of Social Capital Through Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2055, 2061
(1996).
4
See Alces, supra note 2, at 412.
5
See Alice G. Abreu, Taxes, Power, and Personal Autonomy, 33 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 1, 28 n.64 (1996) (noting that when economists refer to “maximizing utility,”
they typically equate utility with material wealth).
6
See Jeanne L. Schroeder, The End of the Market: A Psychoanalysis of Law
and Economics, 112 HARV. L. REV. 483, 513 n.103 (describing traditional law and
economic metric of utility as a measure of happiness); see also Steven P. Croley & Jon
D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort
Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1794-96 (1995) (discussing concept of satisfaction as an
economic metric).
7
See W. Bradley Wendel, Mixed Signals: Rational-Choice Theories of Social
Norms and the Pragmatics of Explanation, 77 IND. L.J. 1, 8 (2002).
8
See JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER 1112 (1989).
9
See Pamela H. Bucy, Games and Stories: Game Theory and the Civil False
Claims Act, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 603, 625 (2004); see also Neil S. Siegel, Sen and the
Hart of Jurisprudence: A Critique of the Economic Analysis of Judicial Behavior, 87
CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1583-85 (1999) (discussing self-interest among legal actors).
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Evolution of Cooperation, concludes that humans interact
optimally when their choices depend upon relative
cooperativeness, patience, and egocentricity.10 Thus, rather
than for the promotion of societal objectives, laws and
normative aspirations are thought to emerge only to facilitate
self-interested parties in achieving maximum utility.11
Naturally, a purely self-interested pursuit might render
individuals predictable, since it would signal anticipated
responses to incentives and other external influences.12 This is
particularly true if, as rational choice theorists contend,
preferences are “ranked, continuous, and stable.”13 Indeed, the
presumption of stable preferences buttresses the very use and
measurability of rational choice analysis; without such
stability, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine
whether a particular choice represents accordance with
preferences, change in preferences, or simply disregard of
preferences.14
A methodological preference among rational choice
theorists for equating “utility” with monetary wealth signifies
Such
another component of rational choice analysis.15
preference enables legal economists to cultivate a more
quantifiable framework,16 while also complying with traditional
economic assessment of behavioral success by level of

10
See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 31-33 (1984) (on
file with author).
11
See Robert Sugden, Contractarianism and Norms, 100 ETHICS 768, 786
(1990); see also AXELROD, supra note 10, at 6-8 (examining role of aspirations in pursuit
of utility).
12
See Jonathan R. Macey, Competing Economic Views of the Constitution, 56
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50, 54 (1987).
13
Tanina Rostain, Educating Homo Economicus: Cautionary Notes on the
New Behavioral Law and Economics Movement, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 973, 976-77
(2000). Contra DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE
THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 17-19 (1994) (finding that
it may be impossible to determine whether a changed decision over time reflects a
violation of the rationality criteria or a change in preferences).
14
See Rostain, supra note 13, at 977.
15
See Wendel, supra note 7, at 8 (noting that rational choice theory might be
objectionable because of its overriding concern with wealth maximization); see also
Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1066 (2000)
(concluding that monetary accumulation is typically cited as the underlying motivation
for rational actors).
16
Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The
Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 641 n.31 (1999) [hereinafter
Hanson & Kysar, The Problem of Market Manipulation].
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accumulated resources.17 It also, by implication, engenders a
normative ethic whereby “it is normal—and hence
appropriate—for people to pursue monetary wealth” and to
measure the achievement of others by their extent of financial
Put differently then, rational choice theorists
wealth.18
generally assume that “rational actors will seek to gratify
fundamental biological drives and, in a market economy, to
accumulate monetary wealth.”19
Nevertheless, “utility” need not equate to monetary
wealth in order to accommodate rational choice analysis.
Indeed, though less preferred for purposes of rational choice
analysis, individuals may place material value in measurable,
but non-monetary forms of “wealth,” such as proximity to
family or professional title.20 Similarly, individuals may value
intangible wealth, such as perceived prestige or sense of
fairness,21 and yet still engage in rational analysis.22 In other
words, rational decision-making need not comprise the pursuit
of maximum monetary wealth, but only that personal
preferences are discernibly ranked and pursued accordingly.23
B.

Application of Rational Choice Theory to Behavioral
Relationships

Legal scholars have applied rational choice theory to
human behavior in specific and relatively familiar settings.
17
See David R. Lagasse, Undue Influence: Corporate Political Speech, Power
and the Initiative Process, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1347, 1370 (1995) (explaining traditional
economic reliance on monetary gains and losses when evaluating micro-economic
behavior).
18
Avery Wiener Katz, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Economics,
94 MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2243 (1996).
19
Mark C. Suchman, On Beyond Interest: Rational, Normative and Cognitive
Perspectives in the Social Scientific Study of Law, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 475, 478.
20
See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, Ranking Journals: Some Thoughts on Theory
and Methodology, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 851, 860-62 (1999) (noting that, because
student-run law reviews often select submissions in part based on the affiliation of the
author, law professors consider reputation of their affiliated school when choosing
between teaching offers).
21
See Daniel A. Farber, Toward a New Legal Realism, 68 U. CHI. L. REV.
279, 280 (2001) (reviewing BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed.,
2000)).
22
Existence of these phenomena is manipulated by related actors, such as
employers, who “value prestige as an independent good because it closely relates to
individual self-esteem and employee morale.” Andrew Cowan, Scarlet Letters for
Corporations? Punishment by Publicity Under the New Sentencing Guidelines, 65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 2387, 2401 (1992).
23
See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, Aspirations and Settlement, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 7-10 (2002) [hereinafter Korobkin, Aspirations and Settlement].
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Perhaps best illustrating this scholarship is an analysis of
litigants and their relative assessment of settlement and
litigation.24 Litigants are said to value rational “aspirations,”
which pertain to an “ideal target settlement sum, or set of
terms,” and that guide litigants in negotiations.25 Conversely, a
litigant’s “reservation price” comprises the least optimal value
nevertheless sufficient for settlement. For plaintiffs, the
reservation price dictates the minimum amount worth
accepting, while for defendants, it refers to the maximum
The area between these two
amount worth paying.26
reservation prices comprises the “bargaining zone,” and when
the two parties fail to identify a figure within that zone,
adjudication results.27 Accordingly, rational choice theory
regards the achievement of settlement as entirely dependent
upon agreement to share wealth, thereby rendering immaterial
“blame” or feelings of “revenge” and “justice.”28 In essence,
then, bargaining between litigants resembles any other form of
bargaining between rational actors, and it is thus
fundamentally indistinguishable from a manufacturer and
supplier negotiating a sales contract or a sports team and
player negotiating an employment contract.
Of course, this rational approach to civil litigation
depends upon the ability of litigants to identify their
bargaining zone. Indeed, rational choice theory surmises that
litigants can determine the expected value of litigating, as well
as the difference in transaction costs between out-of-court
settlement and litigating.29 More concretely, as posited by
rational choice theory, litigants equate the expected value of
each prospective strategy to the probability of that strategy’s

24
Id. at 6 (describing the significance of rational choice theory in litigant
behavioral assumptions).
25
Id. at 3.
26
HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 45 (1982); G.
RICHARD SHELL, BARGAINING FOR ADVANTAGE: NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES FOR
REASONABLE PEOPLE 27 (1999) (on file with author).
27
See John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279,
285 (1973); see also Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic
Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 11 (1995) (identifying that parties will not settle when
expected judgments exceed their expected costs).
28
See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 12-13 (1984); see also Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair
Process: The Problem with Contractarian Theories of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L.
REV. 485, 520 (2003) (noting that scholars sometimes view settlement as “just a type of
ex ante agreement, one that is ex ante relative to the final judgment”).
29
Priest & Klein, supra note 28, at 12.

1466

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:4

success multiplied by its predictive monetary value.30 For
instance, a litigant might conclude that expending
extraordinary resources on discovery would increase the chance
of victory, and that the value generated from that option would
exceed the value generated by expending fewer resources on
discovery but with diminished probability of victory.31
In determining their bargaining zone, litigants—and
their attorneys—must also account for rational choice decisionmaking among judges.
Indeed, rational choice theorists
surmise that trial judges consider the probability of reversal
whenever ranking their preferences for case disposition.32
Thus, in its application to litigant behavior, rational choice
theory demands expansive knowledge from litigants in order to
devise informed preferences.33
Although application of rational choice theory most
often concerns the pursuit of monetary wealth, “utility,” as
noted in the preceding subsection, need not equate to monetary
wealth.34 Indeed, individuals might place material value in
measurable, but non-monetary characteristics, or intangible
characteristics.35 Accordingly, rational decision-makers may
rank preferences in line with non-monetary objectives, thus
generating choices that optimally reflect those non-monetary
preferences.
To illustrate these “other” forms of utility, consider
application of rational choice theory to decision-making among
public actors. For instance, rational choice theory assumes
30
See generally ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE 20-40 (2003) (explaining how parties can use high discovery
strategically to force settlements). Thus, in practice, both litigants will value litigation
based on the weighted average value of all potential outcomes. See Korobkin,
Aspirations and Settlement, supra note 23, at 7 (analyzing conclusions of Priest &
Klein, supra note 28, at 29-30).
31
See David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants Have and
Plaintiffs Don’t, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393, 407 n.35 (2000) (discussing “real world
assumptions” about the relationship between investment in discovery and probability
of success in litigation); see also ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND
ECONOMICS 55-70 (1988) (discussing the theory of rational choice and expected
monetary value); Shavell, supra note 27, at 11 (illuminating predictive roles of cost and
benefit expectations among plaintiffs and defendants).
32
See Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals,
91 CAL. L. REV. 1457, 1483 (2003). The idea of “rational” decision-making by judges
has received substantial critique in recent years. See generally Siegel, supra note 9
(arguing that economic models fail to provide an accurate explanation of judicial
decision-making).
33
See Korobkin, Aspirations and Settlement, supra note 23, at 7-9.
34
See discussion supra p. 1464.
35
See id.
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that elected officials and, more broadly, those drawn to politics,
place greatest value in amassing power.36 Consequently,
political actors appear less interested in monetary wealth than
is traditionally assumed by rational choice theory.37 Similar
deductions have been made of government attorneys, whose
primary self-interest, be it apparent power or civic duty,
appears distinct from that of attorneys engaged in private
practice.38
The utility of these concepts can be further illustrated
by observing the American workforce and opportunities for
employment change. Indeed, studies find that when workers
anticipate an increase in either respect for their labor or
positive feelings of camaraderie, they tend to evince diminished
demand for tangible compensation.39 Alternatively constructed,
by merely accepting an offer that features less monetary
compensation than another offer, an individual implicitly
posits a higher actual value from the chosen offer.40 This
phenomenon is sometimes apparent when law firm partners
have opportunities to become judges or law professors.
Although such positions typically pay less in terms of monetary
compensation, their relatively high prestige and potential for

36

James R. Buckley, The Political Economy of Superfund Implementation, 59
S. CAL. L. REV. 875, 889 (1986) (concluding that “maximum wealth” for political actors
includes power and job security).
37
Less admirably, rational choice theory also assumes that those drawn to
politics are more interested in power than constituent representation or society’s best
interests. See MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON
ESTABLISHMENT (1977). But see Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public
Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the
1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 66 & n.303 (dismissing analysis that concludes that
politicians are “for sale” as inconsistent with the history of tax law promulgation).
38
See Edward Brunet, Class Action Objectors: Extortionist Free Riders or
Fairness Guarantors, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 403, 454-56 (describing unique incentives
and motivations of government attorneys); see also Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, Reflections on Professional Responsibility in a Regulatory State, 63 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1105, 1115-18 (1995) (reasoning that, due to an absence of private market
constraints, government attorneys are more likely to pursue self-interests than are
those attorneys engaged in private practice).
39
Katherine K. Yunker, Addressing the Real Problems for Law and
Economics of Factoring Interest Rates, Earnings Growth and Inflation into Awards for
Lost Future Earnings, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 23 n.57 (1994).
40
See Saul Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort and Other
Law, 68 VA. L. REV. 771, 802 (1982) (“By accepting a low paying job in lieu of a higher
paying one, an individual demonstrates that the total returns from the chosen
position—monetary and nonmonetary—are valued more than those from the job not
taken.”). But see discussion of cognitive biases infra Part III.A.
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intellectual flexibility often induce law firm partners into
concluding that they are superior positions.41
Neoclassical theory offers a useful corollary to
employment opportunities in rational choice models.
It
suggests that workers select employment opportunities that
offer “preference-maximizing packages” of compensation,
working conditions, and subjective characteristics.42 Similarly,
neoclassical theory finds that individuals order their
preferences depending upon value assessed to each
preference.43 To illustrate, consider that when workers may
determine their own hours of work before a change in wage
rates, they often adjust their work hours to reflect their
preferences for work and leisure.44 Accordingly, neoclassical
theory reaffirms predictive characteristics apparent in the
application of rational choice theory.
III.

RETHINKING RATIONAL CHOICE DECISION-MAKING

A.

Raising Doubts: Cognitive Biases

Superficially, rational choice theory furnishes a useful
tool for assessing why individuals make certain decisions.
Upon further reflection, however, it appears limited by
cognitive biases, which are subconscious mental processes that
impair rational thought-processes and ultimately lead to
“irrational” choices. Such biases are prevalent among all
41
See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and
Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051,
1055 (1995) (noting that attorneys are often attracted to the position of judge because
of its prestige and esteem); see also Kenneth F. Ripple, The Role of the Law Review in
the Tradition of Judicial Scholarship, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 429, 434 (2000)
(citing remarks by Justice Cardozo concerning the gradual rise in prestige of law
professors in the legal world). But see Richard A. Posner, Florida 2000: A Legal and
Statistical Analysis of the Election Deadlock and the Ensuing Litigation, 2000 SUP. CT.
REV. 1, 54 (wondering whether judges “exaggerate the value of their prestige to
society”). Some positions, of course, offer both maximum prestige and financial
recompense. See A. Mechele Dickerson, A Behavioral Approach to Analyzing Corporate
Failures, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 23 (2003) (noting that corporate directors often
cite prestige and status associated with their occupation as meaningful).
42
Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace
Cooperation: From Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 753, 828
(1994).
43
See Ignacio de León, A Neo-Institutional Analysis of Vertical Integration
and Its Implications for Antitrust Enforcement in Developing Countries, 26 BROOK. J.
INT’L L. 251, 282 (2000).
44
Philip Harvey, Combating Joblessness: An Analysis of the Principal
Strategies that Have Influenced the Development of American Employment and Social
Welfare Law During the 20th Century, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 677, 721 (2000).
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persons, and by simplifying the processing of information, often
induce mental errors in deliberation of choice.45 To illustrate
cognitive biases, consider that when individuals contemplate
choice, many unknowingly distort the degree of risk or only
selectively remember pertinent information.46 Furthermore,
cognitive biases are distinct from other forms of biases (e.g.,
self-interest; ethnic or gender prejudice), as well as intellectual
predispositions toward certain conclusions (e.g., conclusory
analysis). Instead, they reflect subliminal mental procedures
for processing information.
Since 1955, the role of cognitive biases in decisionmaking processes has intrigued behavioral psychologists. In
that year, Herbert Simon published A Behavioral Model of
Rational Choice, which proposed “replac[ing] the global
rationality of economic man with a” model inclusive of “the
computational capacities that are actually possessed by
organisms, including man, in the kinds of environments in
which such organisms exist.”47 Since that time, economists,
legal scholars, and psychologists have evaluated the
desirability of utilizing cognitive bias analysis in adjusting
expectations for human behavior. Such analysis has proven
useful beyond the academic setting as well. For instance,
businesses routinely adjust marketing and client practices to
accommodate for cognitive biases among customers and
Likewise, policy analysts often qualify
consumers.48
recommendations to account for potential biases among
affected groups.49

45

See generally RICHARDS J. HEUER, JR., PSYCHOLOGY OF INTELLIGENCE
ANALYSIS (1999) (observing effects of cognitive biases on decision-makers); Christine
Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471
(1998).
46
See generally Michelle G. Craske & Deborah C. Pontillo, Cognitive Biases
in Anxiety Disorders and Their Effect on Cognitive-Behavioral Treatment, 65 BULL.
MENNINGER CLINIC 58 (2001).
47
See Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q. J.
ECON. 99, 99 (1955).
48
See, e.g., MARKET PSYCHOL. CONSULTING, Money and Investing Personality
Test,
http://www.marketpsych.com/simulations.php (last visited Jan. 4, 2006)
(detailing how cognitive biases elicited from client bases can be exploited to generate
profits).
49
See, e.g., Josh Kerbel (analyst in the Strategic Assessments Group in the
Directorate of Intelligence), Thinking Straight: Cognitive Bias in the U.S. Debate About
China, 48 STUD. IN INTELLIGENCE 1 (official journal of the Central Intelligence Agency)
(2004), available at http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol48no3/article03.html (discussing
role of cognitive biases in American perceptions of policy choices by China).
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Numerous studies have illustrated the role of cognitive
biases in decision-making processes. Perhaps most heralded,
consider the role of “framing effects” in shaping choice, and
how they diminish assumed rationality among actors. The
most notable such study was conducted by Daniel Kahneman
and Amos Tversky in 1984. It revealed how individuals
respond varyingly to two identical outcomes worded slightly
Specifically, the authors found that when
differently.50
individuals are presented with a hypothetical choice on how to
dispense finite medical care to 600 persons afflicted with a fatal
disease, with one choice resulting in 200 people being saved,
and the other resulting in 400 people dying, they are less likely
to endorse a policy where “400 people will die” than one where
“200 people will be saved.”51 Such a conclusion contradicts the
rational choice model, since a rational actor would make the
same choice regardless of its description.52 Framing effects of
these kinds have been found in other settings as well, and they
diminish the certainty of rational choice predictions.53 Along
those lines, framing effects belie the rational choice assumption
that choices reflect a maximization of utility or relative
strength of preferences, as such choices instead appear
modifiable by unappreciated factors, such as wording of
questions and other circumstances.54
Similarly, consider the effect of confirmation bias,
whereby individuals are subject to ignore or discount
information that challenges existing beliefs.55 Confirmation
bias is especially prevalent among those who are overconfident,
50

See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 343 (1984).
51
Id.
52
See David A. Hoffman & Michael P. O’Shea, Can Law and Economics Be
Both Practical and Principled?, 53 ALA. L. REV. 335, 361 (2002) (describing how
rational actor theory presumes that individuals rank outcomes with identical outcomes
as equal, and thus would not prefer one option over the other).
53
See Hanson & Kysar, The Problem of Market Manipulation, supra note 16,
at 644-46 (discussing use of framing effects by exploitative industry actors).
54
See Hoffman & O’Shea, supra note 52, at 361.
55
See Hanson & Kysar, The Problem of Market Manipulation, supra note 16,
at 647-50. A corollary to confirmation bias is “self-serving” or “egocentric” biases,
whereby individuals “interpret information in a way that disproportionately favors
their own position.” Unlike confirmation bias, however, self-serving or egocentric biases
are likely consciously present. Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A
Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 163, 206 n.199 (2000) [hereinafter Guthrie,
Framing Frivolous Litigation] (noting that these biases may increase plaintiffs’ risk in
seeking frivolous litigation). See generally Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein,
Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP.
109 (1997) (discussing the impact of self-serving biases on settlements).
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and it frequently leads to “irrational” decision-making.56 For
instance, when business or policy managers discuss strategic
planning, they often avoid consideration of worst-case
scenarios, as well as refrain from consulting with “Devil’s
advocates” among their group of advisors.57 Confirmation bias
also affects how employers regard individual employees.
Indeed, as soon as a manager develops reservations about an
employee’s competence, the manager often becomes prone to
negatively interpret confusing or ambiguous circumstances
concerning that employee, while attributing positives
circumstances to luck, coincidence, or someone else’s
Also consider confirmation bias in the law
assistance.58
enforcement setting: When police investigators believe they
have identified the guilty party within a police lineup, they
tend to ask eyewitnesses specifically about that person while
not asking those same questions about others in the lineup.59
Optimism bias has likewise received scholarly attention
as disturbing traditional assumptions among rational choice
theorists. The concept posits that individuals assume that
general risks “do not apply with equal force to themselves.”60
Put differently, optimism bias is “the belief that good things
are more likely than average to happen to us and bad things

56

See John Kelly, Putting Investors on the Couch; With Equity Prices Having
Fallen, Now Would Be a Good Time for Investors to Reappraise Their Portfolios, but
Why Are So Few Actually Doing So?, INVESTMENT ADVISER, Mar. 24, 2003, available at
www.lexis.com (search “News, All (English, Full Text)” for full title in quotes) (noting
need for investment advisors to counter confirmation biases particularly among those
overconfident investors).
57
See Lynne L. Dallas, The New Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate
Boards of Directors, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1363, 1394 n.146 (2002).
58
Jean-Louis Barsoux & Jean-Francois Manzoni, The Downward Spiral, FIN.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2002, at 6.
59
See Gary L. Wells & Eric P. Seelau, Eyewitness Identification:
Psychological Research and Legal Policy on Lineups, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 765,
767 (1995). Academic studies present another area where confirmation biases often
emerge, as researchers tend to discount conflicting data discovered after conclusions
have been made. See Richard E. Petty & John T. Cacioppo, Addressing Disturbing and
Disturbed Consumer Behavior: Is It Necessary to Change the Way We Conduct
Behavioral Science?, 33 J. MKTG. RES. 1, 5 (1996); see also Hans Baumgartner, On the
Utility of Consumers’ Theories in Judgments of Covariation, 21 J. CONSUMER RES. 634,
638 (1995) (discussing existence of confirmation bias during process of data sampling
by academic researchers).
60
Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some
Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1511 (1999) [hereinafter
Hanson & Kysar, Some Evidence of Market Manipulation]; see Melvin Aron Eisenberg,
The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 216 (1995)
(finding that “as a systematic matter, people are unrealistically optimistic”).
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Most
are less likely than average to happen to us.”61
illustratively, because of optimism bias, the average American
estimates a one in five chance of personally being the victim of
a non-terrorist violent crime, yet believes that the average
American has about a two in five chance of being one.62
Alternatively, consider that smokers are inclined to perceive
smoking as significantly less risky for themselves than for
other smokers.63 Indeed, optimism bias tends to flourish when
risks are long-term, or are presumed modifiable through
behavior.64 For that reason, when consumers assume that
signs of toxicity will appear early in product usage, they tend to
then assume that an absence of such signs foretells exemption
from future risk.65
Individuals are also distracted by irrelevant third
options when making decisions. These options most often
emerge in the consumer context. For instance, automobile
manufacturers routinely make a particular model “appear less
expensive by adding a higher-priced option to the product
line.”66 Similarly, manufacturers of “risky” products, such as
unfiltered cigarettes or untested dietary supplements, tend to
61

Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 15, at 1091.
See Neal R. Feigenson, Emotions, Risk Perceptions and Blaming in 9/11
Cases, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 959, 981 n.82 (2003) (citing Jennifer S. Lerner et al., Effects
of Fear and Anger on Perceived Risks of Terrorism: A National Field Experiment, 14
PSYCHOL.
SCI.
144,
149
(2003),
available
at
http://www.hss.cmu.edu/
departments/sds/faculty/Lerner/EffectsOfFearAndAngerOnPerc.pdf.
63
See William B. Hansen & C. Kevin Malotte, Perceived Personal Immunity:
The Development of Beliefs About Susceptibility to the Consequences of Smoking, 15
PREVENTIVE MED. 363, 370-71 (1986); see also Suzanne C. Segerstrom et al., Optimistic
Bias Among Cigarette Smokers, 23 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1606, 1614-17 (1993).
But see W. Kip Viscusi, Constructive Cigarette Regulation, 47 DUKE L.J. 1095, 1113-14
(1998) (presenting evidence that optimism bias is unsupported in the context of
cigarette smoking, as “research on adolescents fails to indicate any significant
difference between risks to oneself and one’s peers”).
64
See Hanson & Kysar, The Problem of Market Manipulation, supra note 16,
at 657 & nn.106-09; see also Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life
Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 806 (1980) (presenting evidence that
individuals ascribe to “unrealistic optimism”).
65
Paul Slovic, Do Adolescent Smokers Know the Risks?, 47 DUKE L.J. 1133,
1137 (1998). Along those lines, optimism bias may prove most pronounced among
children smokers, who often rate their own chances of contracting lung disease as
nearly identical to those of non-smokers. See Jonathan D. Reppucci et al., Unrealistic
Optimism Among Adolescent Smokers and Nonsmokers, 11 J. PRIMARY PREVENTION
227, 235 (1991); see also Michael A. McCann, Dietary Supplement Labeling: Cognitive
Biases, Market Manipulation & Consumer Choice, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 215, 223-27
(2005) [hereinafter McCann, Dietary Supplement Labeling] (discussing optimism bias
among consumers of dietary supplements and how supplement manufacturers may
exploit such a bias).
66
Hanson & Kysar, Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, supra note 60,
at 1440 (discussing irrelevant third options in context of used car sales).
62
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adroitly frame the choice between something dangerous (e.g.,
regular
cigarettes;
supplements
containing
ephedra),
something much less risky (e.g., “unfiltered cigarettes”;
“ephedra-free supplements”), and no action at all. In doing so,
they encourage continued usage from would-be quitters, as the
individual becomes biased in favor of options that he originally
disfavored.67
Also consider the salience of irrelevant third options in
disturbing the presumed stability of ranked preferences within
the rational actor model. For instance, when an individual is
presented with a small or large box of popcorn, she might
choose the small. That same consumer, however, would more
likely choose the large box when also presented with the option
of an extra large box.68 As noted by Richard Thaler, if actors
were entirely rational in their deliberation of choice, and thus
possessed stable options, then the presence of an extraneous
choice, like an extra large box, would not affect the choice
between a small and large box.69 Yet it does.70
Informational deficiencies and time constraints likewise
inhibit strategic and rational decision-making, and they
encourage individuals to make inferences from small sample
sizes. For instance, law enforcement officers, who are uniquely
taxed for time and expected to promptly solve cases, regularly
make conclusive judgments of guilt on the basis of only one or
two witness interviews.71 Similarly, consider trial judges, who,
in contemplating judgment, often consider the probability of
Rational actor analysis maintains that such
appeal.72
consideration should compel judges to rank potential outcomes
(e.g., appellate reversal; appellate remand) associated with

67
Id. at 1515 (discussing irrelevant third options in context of cigarettes); see
also McCann, Dietary Supplement Labeling, supra note 65, at 224 & 226 (discussing
irrelevant third options in the context of dietary supplements).
68
Daniel T. Ostas, Deconstructing Corporate Social Responsibility: Insights
from Legal and Economic Theory, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 261, 294 (2001).
69
See generally RICHARD H. THALER, QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS 42 (1991).
70
Ostas, supra note 68, at 294. See Roger Mason, Interpersonal Effects on
Consumer Demand in Economic Theory and Marketing Thought, 1890-1950, 25 J.
ECON. ISSUES 871 (1995) (finding that marketing schemes often construct, rather than
react to consumer interests).
71
See Wells & Seelau, supra note 59, at 767 (explaining how law enforcement
officers tend to make “strong judgments of validity on the basis of only one
eyewitness”); see also Robert A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the Future of
Behavioral Law and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1663, 1709-10 (2003) (assessing
cognitive biases experienced by witnesses while being interviewed by police).
72
See discussion supra p. 1465 and accompanying notes.
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possible trial choices (e.g., motion denied; motion sustained).73
Trial judges, however, often encounter time constraints, heavy
workloads, and uncertain information that may impair any
strategic value in pursuing these preferences.74 Legal scholars
have observed that in order for judges to accurately discount
the corresponding probability of reversal for each preference,
they would have to possess information concerning the
probability of appeal and settlement, as well as knowledge of
precise preferences embraced by the relevant appellant
judges.75 Thus, in the absence of such information, “rational”
decision-making appears more like guesswork and conjecture.
Cognitive biases may also affect retrospective
assessment of choice.
This is especially apparent with
hindsight bias, which refers to the tendency of individuals to
overestimate the extent to which they anticipated the fruition
of a particular event.76 Put differently, individuals often believe
that they knew something was going to happen when in fact
they did not.77 This phenomenon is especially apparent when
interviewing those prior and after a particular event. For
instance, when voters are asked to project the outcome of an
imminent election, and are later asked to remember their
choice, far more claim to have predicted the correct outcome
than actually did.78 Similarly, when individuals are asked to
73
See Christopher R. Drahozal, Judicial Incentives and the Appeals Process,
51 SMU L. REV. 469, 492 (1998).
74
Cross, supra note 32, at 1485; see also Susan P. Koniak & George M.
Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1124-25 (1996) (describing
indifference of the public and politicians to insistence by trial judges of onerous
workloads and corresponding diminution of quality of judging); Jeffrey A. Parness &
Matthew R. Walker, Thinking Outside the Civil Case Box: Reformulating Pretrial
Conference Laws, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 347, 363 (2002) (identifying time pressures as
observed by Judge Richard Posner).
75
See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the
D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1767-68 n.103 (1997) (describing immense complexity
of predicting reversals on statutory grounds); see also DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN
THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 14 (2002) (illuminating obstacles for trial
judges attempting to forecast probability of appeal success).
76
See W. Kip Viscusi, The Social Costs of Punitive Damages Against
Corporations in Environmental and Safety Torts, 87 GEO. L.J. 285, 328-29 (1998).
77
See, e.g., Scott A. Hawkins & Reid Hastie, Hindsight: Biased Judgments of
Past Events After the Outcomes Are Known, 107 PSYCHOL. BULL. 311, 311-12 (1990);
Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight ≠ Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on
Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. HUM. PERCEPTION &
PERFORMANCE 288, 288 (1975) (first describing the effect).
78
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in
Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 577 (1998). Similar findings have pertained to
subjects who are asked to predict whether a business would be successful, with subjects
claiming “I predicted it” at a higher rate than actually did. Clifton E. Brown & Ira
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predict whether a particular line of products will succeed, an
artificially high percentage will later claim to have identified
the correct outcome.79 Significantly, by distorting individuals’
capacity to objectively evaluate their decision-making and
pursuit of preferences, hindsight bias limits the potential for
ameliorative redress of any other cognitive biases.
Regret aversion, or the tendency to avoid feedback on
forgone conclusions, only exacerbates hindsight bias.80 Such
aversion encourages individuals to shield themselves from
discovering “what might have been” had they pursued
alternative choices.81 Individuals experiencing regret aversion
are similarly averse to comparisons with imagined outcomes,
which may likewise promote sadness or regret.82 Accordingly,
both hindsight bias and regret aversion discourage
retrospective analysis of decision-making. Empirical data
corroborates this idea. Indeed, regret aversion has been found
to influence consumer purchase decisions,83 investor
preferences,84 physician choice of care,85 and, most recently,
litigant behavior.86
Importantly, in light of the aforementioned cognitive
biases, ostensibly objective measures, such as “market value”
and “fair compensation,” may reflect irrational cognitive biases
Solomon, Effects of Outcome Information on Evaluations of Managerial Decisions, 62
ACCT. REV. 564, 568-75 (1987).
79
Brown & Solomon, supra note 78, at 570-73.
80
See Chris Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret Aversion Theory of
Litigation Behavior, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 43 [hereinafter Guthrie, Better Settle Than
Sorry].
81
See David S. Boninger, Faith Gleicher & Alan Strathman, Counterfactual
Thinking: From What Might Have Been to What May Be, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 297, 297 (1994); see also Richard P. Larrick, Motivational Factors in Decision
Theories: The Role of Self-Protection, 113 PSYCHOL. BULL. 440, 445 (1993) (describing
behavioral predilections commonly associated with avoidance of risk).
82
See Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry, supra note 80, at 69-70 & n.133
(citing conclusions in Marcel Zeelenberg et al., Consequences of Regret Aversion: Effects
of Expected Feedback on Risky Decision Making, 65 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 148, 149 (1996)).
83
J. Jeffrey Inman & Leigh McAlister, Do Coupon Expiration Dates Affect
Consumer Behavior?, 31 J. MARKETING RES. 423, 423 (1994) (reasoning that
anticipated regret may account for the increase in consumer coupon redemption
behavior prior to coupon expiration dates).
84
Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law
from Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL.
L. REV. 627, 652-53 (1996).
85
See Cheryl B. Travis et al., Judgment Heuristics and Medical Decisions, 13
PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING 211, 215 (1989) (proposing regret theory as one possible
explanation for clinical treatment decisions).
86
Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry, supra note 80, at 72-79.
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as much as any rational bargaining. As a result, individual
preferences may only partially account for market
determinations, such as the “going-rate” for a particular type of
worker (e.g., a talented chief executive officer; a 20-game
winner in Major League Baseball).87 Indeed, for that very
reason, Cass Sunstein maintains that rational choice models
are “often wrong in the simple sense that they yield inaccurate
predictions.”88 Similarly, Russell Korobkin and Thomas Ulen
find that “individuals are systematically biased in their
predictions of the probable results of various events89 . . . they
frequently act in ways that are incompatible with the
assumptions of rational choice theory.”90
B.

Raising Doubts: Heuristics

The failure of rational choice theory to absorb cognitive
biases invites discussion of further cognitive limitations,
namely human tendencies to incorporate rules of thumb into
their decision-making processes. These “rules of thumb” are
also known as heuristic devices or heuristics, which are
convenient, if unfinished methods to process information.91
Such devices emerge primarily because of processing devices
within the human brain that seek to conserve scarce
resources.92 These devices allow the brain to manage a complex
array of stimuli through shortcuts, largely based on predictive
probability.93
Heuristics, however, exhibit a tendency to encourage
decisions based on illusions, or distorted perceptions.94 For
instance, heuristics may lead individuals to exaggerate health

87

Hoffman & O’Shea, supra note 52, at 361.
Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1175 (1997).
89
Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 15, at 1085.
90
Id. at 1055.
91
See Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 1,
3 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
92
Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the
Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U.
PA. L. REV. 129, 137 (2003).
93
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or
Adaptation?, 79 OR. L. REV. 61, 61 (2000). See Samuel Issacharoff, The Content of Our
Casebooks: Why Do Cases Get Litigated?, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1265, 1275 (2002)
(describing these phenomena in choices among individuals to seek litigation).
94
Rachlinski, supra note 93, at 61.
88
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ailments,95 particularly when those individuals are unable to
measure the presence of actual risk.96 Moreover, the human
mind tends to minimize the role of complexifying context (e.g.,
background factors; situational pressures) and accentuate the
role of salient behavior (e.g., expressed words; physical
For that reason, individuals tend to
manifestations).97
attribute another person’s behavior to her own dispositional
qualities, rather than to circumstances or situational factors.98
The attribution of behavior to disposition rather than
circumstances is considered part of a broader defect called the
“fundamental attribution error,” and heuristics can evince its
effect.99
Heuristics can also adversely influence negotiations.
This is especially apparent with “anchoring and adjustment”
effects, whereby a negotiator begins with a presumptively
rational reference point, but then fails to adjust adequately for
new information.100 Psychologists sometimes describe this
effect as “belief perseverance,” or the tendency to cling to a
viewpoint in the face of disconfirming evidence.101 For instance,
a professional athlete negotiating a contract might estimate his
market value based on a contract earned by a similar player.102
He might then adjust that figure based on perceived variances
between himself and the similar player, such as age,
experience, and injury-history.103 Although such an approach
95
See Robert A. McNutt et al., Patient Safety Efforts Should Focus on
Medical Errors, 287 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1997, 2001 (2002); see also Stephen B. Soumerai
et al., Effect of Local Medical Opinion Leaders on Quality of Care for Acute Myocardial
Infarction: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 279 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1358, 1363 (1998)
(discussing the salience of heuristics in the context of acute myocardial infarctions).
96
See Sidney T. Bogardus, Jr., Eric Holmboe & James F. Jekel, Perils,
Pitfalls, and Possibilities in Talking About Medical Risk, 281 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1037,
1041 (1999) (noting that people frequently utilize heuristic guides to counter difficulties
in understanding risk).
97
See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 92, at 137.
98
See SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 67-86 (2d ed.
1991).
99
For an extensive analysis of the fundamental attribution error, see Jon
Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on
the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1 (2004).
100
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1128 (1974).
101
See Hanson & Kysar, The Problem of Market Manipulation, supra note 16,
at 652-53.
102
See Donald Fehr, Union Views Concerning Agents: With Commentary on
the Present Situation in Major League Baseball, 4 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 71, 79 (1993).
103
See Michael A. McCann, Illegal Defense: The Irrational Economics of
Banning High School Players from the NBA Draft, 3 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 113, 169-
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might appear sensible, studies find that individuals often fail
to adjust sufficiently away from the initial anchor.104 Indeed,
even in the absence of anchor-affirming information,
individuals exhibit a natural reluctance to alter anchors.105
Consequently, the professional athlete might modify the
anchor, but in a way that insufficiently reflects actual
variations between himself and the similar player. Such
phenomena are notable in other fields as well. For instance, in
litigation, the opening offer in a settlement negotiation can
influence the recipient’s judgment of a subsequent final offer,
even when the opening offer does not convey relevant
information.106
Likewise influential are “endowment effects,” whereby
individuals perceive more utility from their current state of
affairs than from altered and equivalent circumstances.107 As a
consequence, individuals often demand more to relinquish an
item than they would pay to obtain that same item.108 For
instance, Kahneman and Tversky find that when individuals
are hypothetically assigned one of two jobs, the first with a
higher salary and the second with better working conditions,
they prefer to remain in their assigned job rather than switch,

72 [hereinafter McCann, Illegal Defense] (discussing impact of age and experience on
contract negotiations in the NBA).
104
See Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Heuristics and Biases at the
Bargaining Table, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 795, 799 (2004).
105
See Gretchen B. Chapman & Eric J. Johnson, Incorporating the Irrelevant:
Anchors in Judgments of Belief and Value, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 130-33 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002); see
also Nicholas Epley & Thomas Gilovich, Putting Adjustment Back in the Anchoring and
Adjustment Heuristic, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI. 391 (2001) (discussing reluctance of individuals
to move away from initial anchors).
106
See Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Opening Offers and Out-of-Court
Settlement: A Little Moderation May Not Go a Long Way, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 1, 11-13, 18-19 (1994). Anchoring and adjustment has also been illustrated by
utilizing different reference points in questioning. See, e.g., Edward J. Joyce & Gary C.
Biddle, Anchoring and Adjustment in Probabilistic Inference in Auditing, 19 J. ACCT.
RES. 120, 122-23 (1981) (illustrating how individuals’ estimation of the likelihood of
corporate fraud varies significantly based on the phrasing of the question).
107
See Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 104, at 802-03; see also Daniel
Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem,
98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990) (supplying findings that confirm the prevalence of
endowment heuristics); Russell Korobkin, Policymaking and the Offer/Asking Price
Gap: Toward a Theory of Efficient Entitlement Allocation, 46 STAN. L. REV. 663, 668-69
(1994) (discussing endowment heuristics in the context of negotiations).
108
See generally Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis,
97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227 (2003) (describing and suggesting strategies for the integration
of endowment effect into legal analysis).
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regardless of which job they are assigned.109 Similar findings
are evident in the investment context: individuals prefer to
maintain existing investment instruments (e.g., stocks; bonds)
and their levels of investment, regardless of the instrument
Further, when negotiating
type or investment level.110
contracts, individuals often prefer terms of trade that are
conventional and generally accepted, simply because they are
familiar.111
Correspondingly, consider myopic heuristics, which
encourage individuals to “stay the course,” even when doing so
would diminish their long-term welfare.112 This in part relates
to the human tendency to be more concerned about losses than
gains, and thus more averse to risk of loss than tempted by
For instance, even in the presence of
potential gain.113
conflicting evidence, shareholders often myopically view
earnings reports to assume that short-term earnings are likely
to continue indefinitely.114 Myopic heuristics also pertain to
systematic over-estimation of costs inherent in change, such as
time, thinking, and soliciting advice.115 To illustrate, consider
that individuals often dismiss future environmental concerns
because they are dissuaded by the complexity of the related
literature, as well as the requisite effort to overcome such
complexity.116
109
Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 50, at 348; see also Russell Korobkin,
The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 627 (1998)
(discussing Kahneman & Tversky and related studies).
110
See William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in
Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 14 (1988) (studying MBA students at
Boston University and public policy graduate students at Harvard University).
111
Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The
Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1587-88
(1998).
112
Jolls et al., supra note 45, at 1479 (describing “bounded willpower” and its
effect on human choices); see also Erik Luna, Race, Crime, and Institutional Design, 66
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 183, 197 (2003) (discussing myopic heuristics in context of
criminal law).
113
Behavioral Finance: Borrowing from Psychology to Explain Behavior,
PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, May 26, 1997, at 32 (discussing myopic risk aversion in
context of investment strategies).
114
See Lucian Arye Bebchuck & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing
Legal Policy Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1102 (1990) (explaining
how management might exploit this behavioral pattern among shareholders to present
short-term earnings in a more favorable light by under-investing in research and
development and other long-term projects).
115
John R. Hauser et al., How Consumers Allocate Their Time When
Searching for Information, 30 J. MARKETING RES. 452, 458 (1993).
116
See U.S. Rep. Earl Blumenauer, Entrepreneurial Environmentalism: A
New Approach for the New Millennium, 30 ENVTL. L. 1, 5 (2000) (observing that
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A more encompassing heuristic pertains to the human
tendency to arrive at conclusions that they are motivated to
reach.117 Indeed, motivation to achieve a certain conclusion
often induces the mind to form impressions, evaluate
observations, and make decisions pursuant to such
motivation.118 The most salient of these motivations is the
desire to see oneself in “self-affirming ways.”119 That is, people
tend to view themselves as harboring good intentions and
To ensure
acting in accordance with moral norms.120
preservation of such selective views, individuals routinely
make dramatic cognitive adjustments, including complete
shielding of conflicting information.121 These adjustments are
especially telling when individuals are confronted with
challenging philosophical choices, such as participation in war
crimes.122
Like cognitive biases then, heuristics may lead to
systemic errors, as judgments about how to best respond to
choice and circumstances can unknowingly discount
meaningful data.123 Taken together, biases and heuristics
reveal significant limits to the rational actor model, and
suggest that individuals may unknowingly pursue less-thanpreferable course of actions. These deleterious tendencies are
only accentuated by individuals’ vast and systematic underappreciation of their capacity to utilize and be manipulated by

“[c]omprehensive environmental approaches are too often laid aside as overly complex
or even impossible to implement”); see also Rebecca M. Bratspies, Myths of Voluntary
Compliance: Lessons from the StarLink Corn Fiasco, 27 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
REV. 593, 642 (2003) (discussing difficulty of understanding environmental regulation);
Edward R. Morrison, Judicial Review of Discount Rates Used in Regulatory CostBenefit Analysis, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1333, 1346-47 (1998) (describing environmental
regulation as an example of a topic where its complexity tends to dissuade inquiry).
117
Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 92, at 138.
118
Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480,
480 (1990).
119
Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 92, at 138.
120
Id.
121
Adam Benforado, Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, Broken Scales: Obesity and
Justice in America, 53 EMORY L.J. 1645, 1659 (2004); see also Abhijit Biswas et al.,
Consumer Evaluation of Reference Price Advertisements: Effects of Other Brands’ Prices
and Semantic Cues, 18 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 52 (1999) (describing how consumers
make cognitive adjustments in value judgments).
122
See Eddie Harmon-Jones & Cindy Harmon-Jones, Testing the Action-Based
Model of Cognitive Dissonance: The Effect of Action Orientation on Postdecisional
Attitudes, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 711, 719-21 (2002) (presenting
subjects with varying difficulties of decisions and assessing results).
123
See Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1178 (1997).

2006]

PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES

1481

cognitive distortions.124 As a result, there often exists a
considerable gap between an individual’s set of preferences and
her pattern of choices, thus undermining the very premise
behind rational choice theory.
Nevertheless, the alleged effects of cognitive biases,
heuristics, and, more broadly, behavioral decision theory are
not without critique. One of the most often cited critiques
suggests that while individuals may display cognitive errors in
laboratory or controlled experiments, they may act more
rationally in real world settings.125 There are also doubts as to
how well cognitive biases and heuristics predict anomalous
behavior, or how well such techniques forecast response to
policy shifts or circumstantial changes.126 In the context of
professional athletes contemplating contractual offers, the
following section will assess the relative strengths and
limitations of rational choice models and competing cognitive
influences.
IV.

PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES & CONTRACTUAL DECISIONMAKING

A.

Relevance to the Study of Law and Economics and
Behavioral Sciences

The potential influence of alternative preferences and
cognitive biases on professional athletes is, to date, an
unexplored topic.
Perhaps this is not surprising, since
professional athletes comprise less than one-tenth of one
percent of the population and are thus considered a
statistically-insignificant population segment by most
Moreover, with their often exorbitant
demographers.127
salaries, generous work schedules, and glamorous lifestyles,
professional athletes tend to be considered extraordinarily
124

See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 92, at 138.
See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits
of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 551 & n.18 (2003) (doubting existence of heuristics
and cognitive biases in contract law); Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing
Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1661 (2003).
126
See, e.g., Jessica L. Cohen & William T. Dickens, A Foundation for
Behavioral Economics, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 335, 335 (2002).
127
See, e.g., Fares al-Braizat, Muslims and Democracy: An Empirical Critique
of Fukuyama’s Culturalist Approach, 43 INT’L J. COMP. SOC. 269 (2002), available at
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/Upload/5_Islamdem_2.pdf
(describing
as
“insignificant” a population that comprises less than one percent of the total
population).
125
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unique and sufficiently incomparable to more socially-relevant
populations.128 Perhaps for these very reasons, professional
athletes have warranted relatively scant consideration by legal
academics.129 Other reasons for their academic marooning
include a more than occasional dismissal of sports law as a
frivolous area of study,130 as well as sports law’s only recent
ascendancy in legal academia.131
Overlooking professional athletes, however, appears to
be a disservice to the study of behavioral law and economics.
Indeed, although a comparatively small group, professional
athletes appear strikingly influential on the world around
them. Most notably, professional athletes play on teams which
supply tangible economic benefit to local communities,
including the generation of employment opportunities for
vendors, concessionaires, security, and other ameliorated
groups, as well as the boosting of sales for adjoining businesses,
such as restaurants, pubs, and hotels.132 Also consider the
128
See, e.g., Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 255-57 (1996) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (highlighting the unique economic position of professional athletes); Dan
Messeloff, The NBA’s Deal with the Devil: The Antitrust Implications of the 1999 NBANBPA Collective Bargaining Agreement, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
521, 532 (2000) (quoting NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION UNIFORM PLAYER
CONTRACT, ¶ 9) (explaining how the “extraordinary and unique skill and ability” of
professional athletes renders them sufficiently distinct from other population groups
considered by the law); Eric D. Scheible, No Runs. No Hits. One Error: Eliminating
Major League Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption Will Not Save the Game, 73 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 73, 100 n.209 (1995) (describing unique nature of professional athlete in
the labor market, and implying how that nature might make legal comparison more
challenging and less predictable).
129
Timothy Davis, What Is Sports Law?, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 211, 212
(2001) (noting that many legal academics believe that analysis of sports does not
warrant academic attention).
130
See, e.g., James R. Elkins, Troubled Beginnings: Reflections on Becoming a
Lawyer, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 1303, 1311 (1996) (quoting JOHN GRISHAM, THE
RAINMAKER (1996)).
131
See Roger I. Abrams, Book Review, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1237, 1238 (1986)
(describing how sports law became popular in the late 1980s, following growth of the
modern sports industry). In fact, since the 1990s, a number of law schools, including
Tulane Law School and Marquette University Law School, offer certificates in sports
law. Larry Cata Backer, Toward General Principles of Academic Specialization by
Means of Certificate or Concentration Programs: Creating a Certificate Program in
International, Comparative and Foreign Law at Penn State, 20 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV.
67, 117 n.115 (2001). See http://www.law.tulane.edu (follow links to “Programs of
Study” and “Sports Law”) (last visited Jan. 25, 2006). In contrast to many legal
scholars, economists have tended to regard professional sports as a useful vehicle from
which to examine a range of theoretical issues. See, e.g., J. Colin H. Jones et al.,
Ethnicity, Productivity and Salary: Player Compensation and Discrimination in the
National Hockey League, 31 APPLIED ECON. 593, 594 (1999) (discussing role of
professional sports in economic research).
132
See generally KENNETH L. SHROPSHIRE, THE SPORTS FRANCHISE GAME
(1995) (claiming that sports teams provide a multiplier effect on local economies);
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capacity of professional sports to effect meaningful broadcast
revenue: the television contracts of the four largest leagues (the
National Football League (“NFL”), Major League Baseball
(“MLB”), the National Basketball Association (“NBA”), and the
National Hockey League (“NHL”)) collectively exceed $4 billion
annually.133 More subjectively, professional athletes supply
appreciable, though intangible benefit to their surrounding
communities, often in the form of team pride or simply the
enabling of fandom and associated enjoyment.134
Perhaps more importantly, and unlike most population
groups, professional athletes furnish published commentary of
their thought processes, as evidenced by regular newspaper,
television, and radio interviews. Moreover, burgeoning playerto-fan discussions, such as chat rooms or blogs, offer
supplemental avenues for players to explain their decisionmaking processes.135 Further commentary is provided by the
media, players’ agents, team executives, and a myriad of
“insiders.”136 In short, there exists a wealth of statements by
SPORTS, JOBS & TAXES: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND STADIUMS (Roger
G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist eds., 1997) (arguing that sports teams create jobs, boost
tourism, and decrease crime). But see MARK ROSENTRAUB, MAJOR LEAGUE LOSERS:
THE REAL COSTS OF SPORTS AND WHO’S PAYING FOR IT (2001) (on file with author)
(dismissing the benefit of sports franchises on the local economy as miniscule); PAUL C.
WEILER, LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD: HOW THE LAW CAN MAKE SPORTS BETTER FOR
FANS 267-69 (2000) (equating a publicly-financed stadium to a public park that charges
expensive admission); Dale F. Rubin, Public Aid to Professional Sports Teams—A
Constitutional Disgrace.
The Battle to Revive Judicial Rulings and State
Constitutional Enactments Prohibiting Public Subsidies to Private Corporations, 30 U.
TOL. L. REV. 393, 418 (1999) (arguing against public finance for professional sports
franchises due to lack of credible evidence such financing ultimately yields greater
benefit than cost).
133
See PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW: TEXT,
CASES, PROBLEMS 389 (2d ed. 1998).
134
See WEILER, supra note 132, at 170 (observing that sports fans follow their
favorite teams and players similar to religious followers); see also Bruce W. Burton &
Matthew J. Mitten, New Remedies for Breach of Sports Facility Use Agreements: Time
for Marketplace Realism, 88 IOWA L. REV. 809, 820 n.37 (2003) (illuminating
psychological benefits identified by sports fans).
135
Some players, such as Red Sox pitcher Curt Schilling, regularly utilize chat
rooms to post their thoughts. Daniel G. Habib, Down to the Last Out, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 27, 2004, at Z8 (noting how Schilling regularly posts on the “Sons
of Sam Horn” message board, which is primarily comprised of devoted Red Sox fans);
see also Howard Bryant, Schilling’s Off Line, BOSTON HERALD, June 15, 2004, at 90
(criticizing Schilling for communicating his feelings directly through Sons of Sam Horn
while refusing to discuss those feelings with reporters).
136
Such insiders even include player wives. See Steven M. Ortiz, The
Ethnographic Process of Gender Management: Doing the “Right” Masculinity with
Wives of Professional Athletes, 11 QUALITATIVE INQUIRY 265, 273 (2005) (interviewing
players’ wives regarding their husbands’ choices in both the personal and professional
arena).
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athletes and those close to them that attest to their values,
beliefs, and priorities when deciding where, and for how much
they want to play, among other choices.
Accordingly,
professional athletes illuminate real world behavioral patterns,
rather than stimuli to experimental circumstances, and, in
doing so, abrogate the alleged “experimental flaw” of many
behavioral law and economic studies.137
Thus, exploring the decision-making processes of
professional athletes in the context of employment
opportunities may prove not only to be an engaging exercise,
but an instrumental analysis of behavioral tendencies in realworld settings. This Article will now turn to this exploration,
and will begin with a discussion of contracting and choice
among professional athletes. Subsequently, it will canvass
actual players who accepted the “less-than-optimal” contract
offers, assuming optimality is defined as the most lucrative
offer. In doing so, this Article will address whether their
choices reflected conscious preferences, such as desire to be
close to home or partiality to warm weather, or cognitive biases
and heuristics that went unappreciated in their decisionmaking processes.
B.

Exploring Contract Negotiations Between Player, Agent
& Team

Like film actors, musicians, and other high-paid,
service-oriented professionals, professional athletes enter into
personal services contracts that reflect their unique skills or
talents.138 In the case of professional athletes, those unique
skills or talents comprise the exceedingly rare ability to
athletically perform in a way that attracts financial
As a result, their “employment” with
remuneration.139
professional sports teams entails their “execution of personal
services contract[s] with the owner or prospective owner of a
137

See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
See M. Scott McDonald, Noncompete Contracts: Understanding the Cost of
Unpredictability, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 137, 143 (2003).
139
To illustrate how exceedingly rare it is for an athlete to ever earn income
playing sports, consider that “[o]nly 3 out of every 10,000 boys who play high school
basketball ever make it to the pros,” and “[o]nly 1 out of every 75 college players ever
makes the jump to the big time.” Fred Bowen, Going Pro: It’s a Long Shot, WASH.
POST, June 29, 2001, at C12 (citing research conducted by the National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA)). Also consider that less than one percent of high school
athletes receive college athletic scholarships. Tony Hansen, Havin’ a Ball at Camp,
BATTLE CREEK ENQUIRER, May 26, 2004, at 1B.
138
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professional sports team for the purpose of future athletic
services.”140
Typically, players’ contracts are negotiated by their
Generally,
agents, who are contracted representatives.141
agents receive a fixed percentage of earnings under player
contracts, which reflects their commission, although some
receive compensation based on hourly rates instead.142 Player
agents perform other services as well, such as negotiating
endorsement contracts, providing financial management and
accounting advice, and resolving disputes that arise under the
athlete’s employment contract.143 Significantly, and as in any
agency relationship, the player (client) possess decision-making
authority for all aspects pertaining to his profession.144
The actual framework for contract negotiation between
player/agent and team greatly depends on the sport and the
player’s level of experience. In all four major sports leagues
(i.e., the NFL, MLB, the NBA, and the NHL), players gain
entrance by selection in an entry draft, whereby a team
“drafts” the player, and obtains that player’s rights to play in
the associated league.145 The primary purpose of a draft is to
140
See Rob Remis & Diana Sudia, Escaping Athlete Agent Statutory
Regulation: Loopholes and Constitutional Defectiveness Based on Tri-Parte
Classification of Athletes, 9 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 1, 65 (1999) (quoting “Definition of
Athlete” under CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-553 (West 1997)).
141
Id.
142
Typically, the fixed percentage is between three and five percent of total
earnings. Eric Willenbacher, Regulating Sports Agents: Why Current Federal and
State Efforts Do Not Deter the Unscrupulous Athlete-Agent and How a National
Licensing System May Cure the Problem, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1225, 1244 & n.139
(2004) (citing Michael Cohen, Meet the Real Jerry Maguires, BOSTON BUS. J., Oct. 5,
1998). More recently, some agents, such as Lon Babby of Williams & Connolly, have
begun utilizing an hourly rate, rather than commission. See generally Stacey M.
Nahrwold, Are Professional Athletes Better Served by a Lawyer-Representative than an
Agent? Ask Grant Hill, 9 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 431, 458-60 (1999) (describing
Babby’s work for Grant Hill of the Orlando Magic).
143
James G. Sammataro, Comment, Business and Brotherhood, Can They
Coincide? A Search into Why Black Athletes Do Not Hire Black Agents, 42 HOW. L.J.
535, 545 & n.50 (1999) (citing Rob Remis, Analysis of Civil and Criminal Penalties in
Athlete Agent Statutes and Support for Imposition of Civil and Criminal Liability upon
Athletes, SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 1, 6 (1998)); see also Richard C. Webb, Personal
Services Lawyering: Sports, Entertainment, Art or Just Plain Risky Business?, 5 S.C.
LAW. 11, 12 (1993) (describing myriad duties of player agents, some of which include
rather undignified duties, such as fielding late-night phone calls pertaining to trivial
matters).
144
See Grace M. Giesel, Enforcement of Settlement Contracts: The Problem of
the Attorney Agent, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 543, 587-88 (1999) (discussing rights of
client versus those of agent).
145
See Michael A. McCann & Joseph S. Rosen, The Legality of Age
Restrictions in the NBA and the NFL, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. (forthcoming, 2006), at
Part 1 (discussing eligibility for NFL and NBA Drafts) (draft of article on file with
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prevent amateur players from bargaining with multiple
teams.146 Indeed, in each of the four major leagues, once a team
drafts an amateur player, his playing rights become the
exclusive property of that team for at least one calendar year,
and he can negotiate with no other teams during that time.147
If a player chooses not to sign and wait one year, the team that
drafted him no longer controls his rights, but that player’s only
option to gain entry into the league is to enter the draft again,
“and if drafted a second time, he again becomes the property of
[another] team for one year.”148 Practically, therefore, the draft
is the exclusive entrance for amateur players into professional
sports.
Once drafted, an athlete signs a player contract in
accordance with the league’s collective bargaining agreement.
There are significant variations among the four major sports
leagues for entry contracts, as parameters for such contracts
reflect the product of negotiations between individual leagues
and players’ associations. For instance, while players selected
in the NBA Draft sign for pre-determined salary slots in
accordance with their draft position,149 players selected in the
MLB Draft can negotiate their own contracts. Though heavily
influenced by draft position, such contracts may vary widely
upon leveraging circumstances, such as whether the player has
remaining collegiate eligibility, or whether the team possesses
sufficient funds to sign its draft selections.150
author); Erik Ekblad, Note, A Slice into the Sand Trap: Why the PGA Was Unwise in
Its Decision to Push Its Dispute with Casey Martin to the Supreme Court, 32 SW. U. L.
REV. 151, 174 (2003) (noting mechanics of MLB Draft and NHL Draft).
146
See McCann, Illegal Defense, supra note 103, at 130.
147
See, e.g., NBPA, Collective Bargaining Agreement, July 30, 2005, art.
X(1)(b)(ii), available at http://nbpa.org/cba_articles/article-X.php#section1 (last visited
Jan. 26, 2006) (stipulating the rule for players selected in the NBA Draft); NFL
Collective Bargaining Agreement, art. XVI, 4(b), at 44 (1993), available at
http://www.nflpa.org/Members/main.asp?subPage=CBA+Complete#art16 (last visited
Jan. 26, 2006) (stipulating that the playing rights of players selected in the NFL Draft
remain the property of the drafting team for one calendar year); Jeffrey A. Rosenthal,
The Amateur Sports Draft: The Best Means to the End?, 6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 1, 19 n.79
(1995) [hereinafter Rosenthal] (citing Major League Baseball Professional Rules Book
4(e) (1988), which stipulates that the playing rights of players selected in the MLB
Draft remain the property of the drafting team for one calendar year or until the player
returns to college, whichever is shorter)). While occasional exceptions to this standard
exist, they are seldom employed. Peter N. Katz, Comment, A History of Free Agency in
the United States and Great Britain: Who’s Leading the Charge, 15 COMP. LAB. L.J.
371, 384 n.82 (1994).
148
McCann, Illegal Defense, supra note 103, at 129-30.
149
See discussion infra pp. 1487-88.
150
Rosenthal, supra note 147, at 17-20; see also Jack Curry, Fulfilling Great
Expectations: Barry Lamar Bonds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2001, § 8, at 1 (describing how
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Regardless of the league, a drafted player can only
maximize his earning potential by eventually obtaining “free
agent” status, whereby the player may negotiate and sign with
any team.151 Typically, such status emerges only after a player
has accrued a certain level of service time in a particular
league, and only after his existing contract has expired.152
There are two types of free agency: “unrestricted” free agency,
whereby a player can negotiate and sign with any team after
his contract expires, and “restricted” free agency, whereby a
player can likewise negotiate and sign with any team after his
contract expires, but the original team reserves the right to
“match” any signed contract or otherwise receive compensation,
usually in the form of draft selections.153 Thus, an unrestricted
free agent possesses the optimal bargaining position: he can
sign with any team, and the team with which he signs owes no
compensation to his prior team.154
To illustrate the economic path of a professional athlete,
consider an amateur player who seeks to enter the NBA. This
player must participate in the NBA Draft, in which he will
either be drafted by a team in one of two rounds, or not
selected. If he is drafted in the first round, he will sign a
guaranteed two-year contract for a pre-determined amount,
ranging from $9.0 million for the first pick to $1.8 million for
the last pick in that round.155 The NBA team that drafts him
Barry Bonds was originally drafted in 1982 by the San Francisco Giants, chose to
attend Arizona State instead, and in 1985 was drafted by the Pittsburgh Pirates, with
whom he signed).
151
See generally WEILER, supra note 132, at 170-97 (discussing free agency’s
effect on the professional sports leagues). See also McCann, Illegal Defense, supra note
103, at 212 (discussing impact of free agency on career earnings opportunities for NBA
players); Note, NFL Free Agency Restrictions Under Antitrust Attack, 1991 DUKE L.J.
503 (1991) (exploring impact of free agency on player salaries in the NFL).
152
For instance, in MLB, a player can only become a free agent after six years
of service time. See Joshua Hamilton, Comment, Congress in Relief: The Economic
Importance of Revoking Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1223,
1240 & n.144 (1998) (explaining the history and rationale behind the rule).
153
See Note, supra note 151, at 503 nn.1-2.
154
See Ethan Lock, The Regulatory Scheme for Player Representatives in the
National Football League: The Real Power of Jerry Maguire, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 319, 32628 (1998) (explaining the implications of unrestricted and restricted free agency for
professional athletes).
155
See NBPA, Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 147, at Exhibit B,
available at http://nbpa.org/cba_exhibits/exhibitB.php (last visited Jan. 26, 2006); see
also McCann, Illegal Defense, supra note 103, at 125 & n.37, 128 & tbl. 4 and
accompanying text (describing draft pick economics in preceding collective bargaining
agreement and how players selected in the first round of the NBA Draft can negotiate
between 80% and 120% of stated annual salaries, and how, in practice, they always
negotiate 120%).
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may extend his contract following his second and third seasons,
although he may become a restricted free agent at the
conclusion of his fourth season.156 Only at the conclusion of his
fifth season may he become eligible for unrestricted free
agency.157 In contrast, if he is drafted in the second round, he
may obtain unrestricted free agency status earlier in his
career, although most players selected in the second round sign
either non-guaranteed contracts for the league minimum
($398,762) or simply fail to earn a contract.158 If he is not
drafted in either round, then he immediately becomes an
unrestricted free agent, though seldom does such a player ever
play in the NBA.159
Assuming the player described in the preceding
paragraph becomes a star, his earning capacity as an
unrestricted free agent would prove quite impressive. Indeed,
after completion of his rookie contract, and upon becoming an
unrestricted free agent, that player may sign a contract worth
up to the “maximum contract,” which reflects the longest and
156

NBPA, Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 147, at art. VIII,
available at http://nbpa.org/cba_articles/article-VIII.php (last visited Mar. 2, 2006).
157
From a practical standpoint, most players remain with their team at the
conclusion of the fourth season. Indeed, the 2005 Collective Bargaining Agreement
preserves the so-called “Larry Bird exception,” which allows teams to exceed the salary
cap in order to re-sign their own players (also called “Larry Bird rights”). See McCann,
Illegal Defense, supra note 103, at 124-25. Thus, when a first round pick concludes his
fourth season, usually the team for which he has played can offer him the most.
158
See NBPA, Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 147, at Exhibit C,
available at http://nbpa.org/cba_exhibits/exhibitC.php (last visited Jan. 26, 2006). Very
rarely, a second round pick will surprise the NBA and become a competent player or
even a star player. Under the 1999 Collective Bargaining Agreement, such star
players could gain optimal negotiating power at the conclusion of their second season—
when their rookie contracts would typically expire—as they became “non-Larry Birdrights restricted free agents,” since Larry Bird rights only manifest after a player plays
three seasons. As a result, the “restricted” nature of their free agency was curtailed,
since, due to the absence of Larry Bird rights, the team for which they played could not
re-sign them for any amount above the salary cap. This very machination arose in
2003, when 2001 second round pick Gilbert Arenas of the Golden State Warriors
became a restricted free agent, and because Arenas had no Larry Bird rights and
because the Warriors’ payroll exceeded the league-imposed salary cap, the Warriors
could not match the six-year, $65 million free agent contract Arenas had signed with
the Washington Wizards. See McCann, Illegal Defense, supra note 103, at 126-27. The
2005 Collective Bargaining Agreement, however, disallows other teams from offering
such a player more than $4.5 million for his third season, an amount all NBA teams
may utilize through its “mid-level exception” to the salary cap, regardless of whether
the team’s payroll exceeds the salary cap. As a result, teams may hold on to their
second-round picks long enough to invoke their Larry Bird rights. See NBPA,
Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 147, at art. XI(5), available at
http://nbpa.org/cba_articles/article-XI.php#section5 (last visited Mar. 2, 2006); see also
NBPA, Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 147, at art. X(1)(b)(ii), available at
http://nbpa.org/cba_articles/article-X.php#section1 (last visited Jan. 26, 2006).
159
See McCann, Illegal Defense, supra note 103, at 122.
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most lucrative contract allowable under the NBA’s collective
bargaining agreement.160 Currently, that maximum contract is
worth approximately $91 million over a six-year period.161
Although such a contract is typically reserved for the league’s
best players, even far less-heralded players may obtain
This
exorbitant deals as unrestricted free agents.162
phenomenon is not unique to basketball, as unrestricted free
agents in baseball, football, and hockey likewise position
themselves for extraordinarily lucrative contracts.163
Thus, the most dynamic setting for professional sports
contracting occurs when a player becomes an unrestricted free
agent, attracts meaningful interest from multiple teams, and
negotiates with those teams to yield the optimal contract. Put
differently, this setting offers a “competitive market,” since
there exists a market of sellers (i.e., the teams) competing for
the attraction of a buyer (i.e., the player).164 Though varying
circumstances, such as number of interested teams and relative
skill of representation, as well as collectively-bargained
restraints of trade, such as “salary caps” and “luxury taxes,”165

160
See NBPA, Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 147, at art. II(7),
available at http://nbpa.org/cba_articles/article-II.php#section7 (last visited Jan. 26,
2006).
161
Id. This figure is based on an amount up to thirty percent of the NBA’s
salary cap in effect at the time the contract is executed, and can thus change in
correspondence to any changes in the salary cap. Id. at art. II(7)(a)(2).
162
For instance, consider Mark Blount, the much-maligned Minnesota
Timberwolves center, who, as an unrestricted free agent in 2004, managed to secure a
six-year contract worth $42 million with the Boston Celtics. Shira Springer, Celtics Do
New Deal for Blount, BOSTON GLOBE, July 9, 2004, at E1. Another strikingly lucrative
free agent contract was obtained by Derek Fisher, the venerable but middling point
guard, who, as an unrestricted free agent in 2004, signed a six-year contract worth $37
million. David DuPree, Lakers Have Plenty of Retooling To Do, USA TODAY, July 16,
2004, at 14C.
163
See, e.g., WEILER, supra note 132, at 185 (“[A]verage MLB salaries have
soared under free agency.”); see also Mélanie Aubut, When Negotiations Fail: An
Analysis of Salary Arbitration and Salary Cap Systems, 10 SPORTS LAW. J. 189, 198201 (describing optimal bargaining position for MLB players); Lock, supra note 154, at
335-39 (describing optimal bargaining position for NFL players); Stephen F. Ross, The
NHL Labour Dispute and the Common Law, The Competition Act, and Public Policy, 37
U.B.C. L. REV. 343, 403 (2004) (describing optimal bargaining position for NHL
players).
164
See Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and
Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1790 (1997).
165
A salary cap is a ceiling on the total amount teams may spend on player
salaries, while a luxury tax requires teams with payrolls over a particular threshold to
pay a percentage of the excess to the other teams in the league. Id. Thus, a salary cap
imposes an actual limit on team payroll, while a luxury tax serves as a deterrent to
teams that would otherwise spend above a certain threshold. See generally Thomas A.
Piraino, Jr., A Proposal for the Antitrust Regulation of Professional Sports, 79 B.U. L.
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affect the degree of market competition, meaningful
engagement among multiple parties tends to emerge whenever
a player becomes an unrestricted free agent.166
Lastly, note the relatively brief earnings curve for most
professional athletes, and thus their limited window of time to
capitalize on lucrative earnings. Indeed, in all four major
leagues, the average career only lasts between four and six
years,167 and only a small percent of players within those
leagues play into their late thirties or beyond.168 Along those
lines, most professional athletes are considered in their “prime”
for a mere two- or three-year stretch, which typically occurs
between the ages of 27 and 30; outside of that window, athletes
usually possess diminished earnings potential.169 Thus, and
along with the need to accrue sufficient service time in order to
obtain free agent eligibility, many professional athletes possess
only one opportunity to “cash in” as unrestricted free agents.
In part for that reason, many seek to maximize their earnings
as free agents. This topic, along with evidence of alternative
free agent pursuits, will be explored in the following section.
V.

IDENTIFYING CHOICE, BIAS, AND HEURISTICS AMONG
PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES

A.

Evidence of Monetary-Maximizing Values Among
Professional Athletes

The setting of an unrestricted free agent negotiating
with multiple teams drives several analytical interpretations.
Traditional rational choice theory would posit that such an
athlete, like any rational actor, would pursue maximization of
REV. 889, 936-39 (1999) (comparing salary caps and luxury taxes as modes to ensure
competitive play in professional sports).
166
Other externalities might include an absence of perfect information and
certain obstacles to the execution of contracts, such as league approval.
167
See McCann, Illegal Defense, supra note 103, at 170 (noting that the
average NBA career lasts five years); Alan Gersten, Show Me the Money: Why
Professional Athletes Make Tough Clients, FIN. PLANNING, Mar. 1, 2005, at 5 (noting
that the average NHL career lasts six years, the average MLB career lasts three and a
half years, and the average NFL career also lasts three and a half years).
168
See, e.g., McCann, Illegal Defense, supra note 103, at 170 (discussing how
only three percent of NBA players are over the age of thirty-five); Martin Miller,
Raising the Bar at 40, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2003, at F1 (noting how, in 2003, only
eleven MLB players, nine NHL players, six NFL players, and two NBA players were
forty or older).
169
Id. But see Michael Russo, Many Free Agents, Not Much Money, SUNSENTINEL, July 1, 2001, at 15C (noting several large contracts obtained by aging NHL
players).
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“utility,” as best, or most readily evidenced by monetary
wealth. This deduction may be observed at both the macro and
micro level. Most dramatically, consider the recent precipitous
rise in player salaries, an ascent primarily attributed to the
maximization of monetary interests during free agent
bargaining.170 For instance, since 1995, the average NHL
player salary has risen by 245 percent ($733,000 to $1.8
million), during which time league revenue has grown by only
163 percent.171 Similarly astounding, consider that since 1983,
the average NBA player salary has grown by 1,892 percent
($246,000 to $4.9 million),172 or that since 1989, the average
MLB player salary has risen by 423 percent ($497,000 to $2.6
million).173 These trends suggest that maximization of wealth
proves a salient consideration to many professional athletes,
thus corroborating a traditional rational choice model.
On a micro level, traditional rational choice would find
that when players (and their representatives) negotiate with
teams, they each begin with a reservation price, defined in this
context as the maximum amount each is willing to relinquish
or the minimum amount each is willing to accept.174 To
illustrate, imagine a player who seeks a contract extension
170
See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN
UNFAIR GAME (2003) (discussing precipitous increase in salaries among MLB players
since the advent of free agency, and how such a development has disadvantaged
smaller-market teams); Richard A. Kaplan, Note, The NBA Luxury Tax Model: A
Misguided Regulatory Scheme, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1615 (2004) (studying economic
trends in the NBA); Sanjay José’ Mullick, Browns to Baltimore: Franchise Free Agency
and the New Economics of the NFL, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 1 (1996) (studying economic
trends in the NFL); Joseph M. Weiler, Legal Analysis of the NHL Players’ Contract, 3
MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 59 (1992) (studying economic trends in the NHL); ANDREW
ZIMBALIST, MAY THE BEST TEAM WIN: BASEBALL ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY (2003)
(studying economic trends in MLB).
171
See Dave Stubbs, Europe Might Elbow NHL out of Picture, MONTREAL
GAZETTE, Feb. 17, 2005, at A3 (noting the increase in player salary); Michael Arace,
Players Ratify New Deal, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 22, 2005, at 1F (noting the
increase in league revenue).
172
See Looking for a Model? Try the NBA, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 16, 2004, at C4
(noting the current average NBA salary); David Dupree, NBA: Red Ink and a Bleak
Future, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 1983, at D1 (noting the average NBA salary in 1983).
The increase in average NBA salary has closely approximated the increase in league
revenue, which has risen 1,840 percent since 1983 ($160 million to $3.1 billion).
Looking for a Model?, supra (citing current league revenue); Union Alters Stance, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 26, 1983, at 1 (noting projected revenues for 1984-85 season).
173
See Murray Chass, Players’ Figures Show $497,254 Pay Average, SPORTING
NEWS, Dec. 18, 1989, at 44 (noting the average MLB salary in 1989) (on file with
author); Tim Tucker, Baseball Pay Creeps Up, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 10, 2005, at 2E
(noting the current average MLB salary).
174
See DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR:
BARGAINING FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVE GAIN 51 (1986).
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from his existing team, but because he has not yet accrued
sufficient service time for free agent eligibility, he cannot
pursue employment with any other team should such an
extension fail.175 If this player enters contract negotiations
with a reservation price of $2 million per year, it means that he
is unwilling to accept any contract that pays him less than $2
million per year, and also that he is willing to pursue noncontractual resolutions in lieu of a contract for less than $2
million per year. The primary such resolution is a “hold-out,”
whereby the player refuses to report to his team (and thus
forfeits pay) in hopes that doing so will motivate that team to
acquiesce.176
Importantly, there exists a meaningful distinction
between “public” and “private” reservation prices, and such
prices may evolve in accordance with unexpected or non-static
market conditions.177 For instance, after completing his most
recent contract with the Atlanta Braves in October 2003,
pitcher Greg Maddux instructed his agent to inform teams that
he would accept no less than a two-year contract worth $20
After four months of unexpectedly lukewarm
million.178
interest, however, Maddux would agree to a two-year contract
worth $15 million with the Chicago Cubs.179

175

This fact-pattern arises with some regularity in MLB, the NFL, and the
NHL, though less often in the NBA, as the league’s CBA stipulates more discernable
contract parameters, thus diminishing opportunities for discord between player and
team in negotiating contract extensions. See McCann, Illegal Defense, supra note 103,
at 195.
176
For instance, during NFL training camp in August 2004, Miami Dolphins’
defensive end Adewale Ogunleye held out in hopes of receiving a long-term extension
instead of a one-year extension tendered by the Dolphins. Alex Marvez & Keven
Lerner, Dolphins Reward Chambers, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 6, 2004, at D3. Rather
than acquiescing to his demand, the Dolphins traded Ogunleye to the Chicago Bears,
who promptly signed Ogunleye to a long-term extension. Mike Mulligan, Bears Can
Alter Stingy Image in a Buy Week, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 24, 2004, at 105; see also Basil
M. Loeb, Comment, Deterring Player Holdouts: Who Should Do It, How to Do it, and
Why It Has to Be Done, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 275, 275-79 (2001) (providing a
detailed background of holdouts in professional sports and how players internalize the
relative risks and benefits of pursuing holdouts).
177
See Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? Market
Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235, 1237 n.150 (describing how
reservation prices are affected by modified expectations and how they may be
strategically revised to accommodate such expectations).
178
See Tom Verducci, Hard Line: Will Scott Boras’s Waiting Game Help or
Hurt His Clients This Year?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 19, 2004, at 84.
179
Mike Kiley, Wood Takes Cubs’ Sales Pitch, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 28, 2004,
at 102 (noting also that the contract included a possible third year for $9 million if
Maddux pitches a certain number of innings during the 2004 and 2005 seasons).
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During actual negotiations, rational choice analysis
would find players and teams attempting to identify their
bargaining zone, which, as discussed in Section II, comprises
the range of amounts between competing reservation prices.180
Within this range, any amount would prove “mutually
beneficial, or ‘Pareto superior’ to the alternative of not reaching
an agreement.”181 Put more succinctly by Richard Posner,
Pareto superior “makes at least one person better off and no
one worse off.”182
In the context of professional sports negotiations,
effectively identifying the bargaining zone depends upon
negotiation parameters, such as whether the negotiations
concern a free agent or a current employee, as well as the
number of potential suitors for the player. Predictably, a free
agent with numerous teams pursuing his services generally
has less of an incentive to identify a bargaining zone with any
one of those teams than would a player negotiating a contract
extension with his present team, particularly if that player
would not become a free agent in the near future.183 Bargaining
zones may also provide room for settlement when the parties
reach incompatible estimates of each others’ reservation
price.184 Along those lines, settlement proves especially likely

180
See discussion infra pp. 1464-65 and accompanying notes; see also Russell
Korobkin, A Positive Theory of Legal Negotiation, 88 GEO. L.J. 1789, 1816-17 (2000).
Professor Robert H. Mnookin characterizes the bargaining zone as the “zone of possible
agreement.” See ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO
CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 20 (2000).
181
See Korobkin, Aspirations and Settlement, supra note 23, at 5.
182
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 14 (5th ed. 1998).
183
Even with the more favorable circumstances described herein, a player
may nevertheless prove unwilling to constructively pursue the bargaining zone. For
instance, as discussed below on pages 1520-1524, at the start of the 2003 MLB season,
it is speculated that Boston Red Sox shortstop Nomar Garciaparra was unwilling to
negotiate a contract extension, despite the team’s interest in consummating one, and
despite the fact that Garciaparra would not be eligible for free agency until after the
2004 season. Dan Shaughnessy, Damaged Goods: Deal Garciaparra, BOSTON GLOBE,
July 3, 2004, at G1 [hereinafter Shaughnessy, Damaged Goods] (asserting that Red
Sox management doubted Garciaparra’s actual willingness to negotiate). But see Julie
S. Turner, The Nonmanufacturing Patent Owner: Toward a Theory of Efficient
Infringement, 86 CAL. L. REV. 179, 197 (1998) (describing the presence of multiple
parties as an impediment to the consummation of an agreement between two parties).
184
George A. Loewenstein & Don A. Moore, When Ignorance Is Bliss:
Information Exchange and Inefficiency in Bargaining, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 37, 45 (2004)
(describing the value of large bargaining zones in difficult negotiations).
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when parties perceive limited or unsatisfying alternatives to an
agreement.185
Nevertheless, incompatible estimates of competing
reservation prices occasionally yield impasse, whereby the
parties, frustrated by their failure to reach a number within
the bargaining zone, cease negotiations.186 Some traditional
rational choice theorists believe that impasse arises due to a
lack of shared information, which eventually motivates parties
to misinterpret each others’ reservation price.187 More recent
analysis, however, suggests that sharing of information may
actually promote divergence between the parties, particularly
when such information invites disparate interpretation.188 This
later finding appears corroborated by the “self-serving” bias
apparent during negotiations, as even contemporary rational
choice analysis identifies a tendency among parties to interpret
information in egoistic ways, thus further impairing their
pursuit of a mutually-satisfying number.189
To illustrate the difficulties of identifying a number
within the bargaining zone, as well as the presence of selfserving bias in estimating the competing reservation price,
consider the effect of “market-setting” contracts in professional
sports. These contracts establish an economic barometer by
which other players and teams may determine market value in
the same economic period.
This barometer is especially
illuminating in a free agency period, as it allows instant and
contemporaneous comparisons of existing free agents with
those who had recently signed contracts. Often, comparative

185

See Kevin C. McMunigal, The Costs of Settlement: The Impact of Scarcity of
Adjudication on Litigating Lawyers, 37 UCLA L. REV. 833, 861 n.106 (1990) (noting
that negotiations are guided by the presence of alternative and viable opportunities).
186
Impasse may be defined as “that point at which the parties have exhausted
the prospects of concluding an agreement and further discussions would be fruitless.”
Laborers Health and Welfare Trust Fund for N. California v. Advanced Lightweight
Concrete Co., 484 U.S. 539, 543 n.5 (1988).
187
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 525 (3d ed. 1986); see
also Steven Shavell, Sharing of Information Prior to Settlement or Litigation, 20 RAND
J. ECON. 183 (1989) (applying information-sharing to the context of litigation, and
finding that discovery promotes settlement since it reveals information to opposing
parties).
188
See Loewenstein & Moore, supra note 184, at 38-39.
189
See George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and
Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 159 (1993) (identifying implications of selfserving assessments of fairness for bargaining).
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characteristics include relative performance to date,
expectation of future performance, age, and injury history.190
For example, consider that when the New York Mets
signed pitcher Kris Benson to a three-year, $22.5 million
contract at the start of the 2004 free agency period, observers
perceived the contract as “market-setting,” since it established
a contemporary value for free agent pitchers of Benson’s ilk.191
Indeed, following consummation of Benson’s contract, a
number of free agent pitchers elevated their asking prices, and
estimated their market value as greater than that of Benson,
and thus warranting a contract in excess of a three-year, $22.5
million term.192 In response, the relevant negotiating teams
tended to dismiss the Benson contract as reflective of one
team’s desperation to win—and thus its willingness to pay
above market value.193 Therefore, the “new information” of
Benson’s contract proved sufficiently ambiguous as to invite
contrasting interpretations by the negotiating parties. In fact,
several free agent pitchers and teams so disparately
internalized the Benson contract that their negotiations
reached irreparable impasses.194 Subsequently, those pitchers
initiated negotiations with new teams, and reached contracts
consistent with the market established by the Benson
contract.195 Accordingly, by potentially bifurcating existing
negotiations, a market-setting contract might establish a
barometer of varying compatibility to existing and potential
190
See, e.g., Rick Carpiniello, Free Agent Situations Are Getting Sticky, J.
NEWS, Oct. 17, 1999, at 7C (describing contract negotiations with star players in the
NHL); see also Jeffrey D. Schneider, Note, Unsportsmanlike Conduct: The Lack of Free
Agency in the NFL, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 797 (1991) (discussing relevant characteristics
for free agent analysis).
191
See Larry Stone, Winners of Winter, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 25, 2005, at D1
(“[T]he pitching market was established, most GMs agree, when the Mets signed Kris
Benson to a three-year, $22.5 million contract.”).
192
See, e.g., Tyler Kepner, Age-Wary Yanks Pick Wright over Lieber, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 9, 2004, at D7 (noting that the Benson contract prompted free agent
pitcher Jon Lieber to increase his own contract demands).
193
See Mark Hale, Sosa in Sight: But Fat Pact Could Break Deal for Mets,
N.Y. POST, Nov. 13, 2004, at 72 (describing the desire of new Mets’ general manager
Omar Minaya to “make a splash”).
194
See, e.g., Bob Elliott, D-Backs on Spending Spree: A Day After Landing
Troy Glaus, Arizona Signs Russ Ortiz to a Four-Year, $33 Million Deal, TORONTO STAR,
Dec. 11, 2004, at S8 (citing remarks by Blue Jays’ general manager J.P. Ricciardi that
Russ Ortiz altered his contract demands with the Atlanta Braves after the Benson
contract); Todd Zolecki, Yankees’ Missed Opportunity a Plus for Phillies, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Mar. 6, 2005, at D6 (discussing how the New York Yankees refused the
revised demands of free agent pitcher Jon Lieber following the Benson contract,
leading Lieber to sign with the Philadelphia Phillies).
195
See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
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teams, and thus impair the capacity of contemporaneously
negotiating parties to identify a number within the bargaining
zone.196
B.

Evidence of Alternative Preferences Among Professional
Athletes

The preceding discussion frames player-team contract
negotiations as entirely driven by the distribution of monetary
resources. That is, it assumes that players exclusively value
financial
compensation
when
seeking
employment
opportunities. Such an assumption is commonly held among
Media and other journalists often feel
Americans.197
198
similarly.
Such framing begs an important question: Why should
society assume that professional athletes are unusually
interested in monetary wealth? Indeed, as discussed in Section
II, when individuals pursue employment opportunities, they
often identify considerable value in non-monetary forms of
“utility.”199 Such forms of utility might include objective
characteristics, such as preferred location or job title, or
intangibles, such as projected happiness or anticipated social
These ideas are also consistent with rational
status.200
decision-making, since “rationality” of choice refers to the
196

See supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
See Thomas Boswell, Players, Owners and Us, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1994,
at F1. Similarly, most Americans believe that athletes are paid too much money. Don
Walker, Baseball Slips a Bit on State Poll: Interest Drops with Attendance, MILWAUKEE
J. SENTINEL, May 26, 2003, at 6C (citing survey conducted by the University of
Wisconsin that found that 89 percent of Americans believe professional athletes make
too much money); see also, Michael Hiestand, Put a Lid on Pro Player Salaries, USA
TODAY, Sept. 2, 2004, at 3C (citing remarks by Ralph Cindrich, an NFL player agent
and former NFL player, who stated the opinion that if Americans were polled, 98
percent would say that “athletes are paid too much” money). Data suggests that
teenagers feel likewise. See, e.g., Teen Ink, February 2001 Poll: Do Baseball Players
Make Too Much Money, available at http://www.teenink.com/Poll/PastPolls.html (last
visited Jan. 4, 2006) (finding that 71 percent of teenagers believe baseball players
“make too much money”); Most Kids Look Up To Athletes: Fewer Are Influenced by
Them, 12 YOUTH MARKETS ALERT 1 (2000) (finding that 43 percent of children ages ten
to seventeen believe that athletes appear in ads for charities to get paid and improve
their personal image, rather than caring about the cause).
198
See, e.g., Mark Patinkin, For Too Many Pro Athletes, It’s All About the
Money, PROVIDENCE J., Feb. 20, 2005, at A2 (regarding the NHL Lockout of 2004-05 as
evidence of greed among NHL players); Bob Raissman, Going Ratings Bad News for
Boss, DAILY NEWS (New York), June 11, 2000, at 67 (“This is [a sports] era where it’s
all about the money.”).
199
See discussion supra pp. 1462-63.
200
See id.
197
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methodological pursuit of personal preferences, which vary by
individual. Thus, unless professional athletes prove somehow
“more greedy” than the average person, they should exhibit,
with similar frequency, a preference for non-monetary forms of
utility when contemplating employment opportunities.
A review of expressed player motivations for accepting
offers reveals a wide-range of preferences. Although many
athletes pursue the most lucrative offer available, many others
opt for less remunerative opportunities. Through the following
illustrations, this Article will explore alternative optimal
preferences to monetary aggrandizement, and how professional
athletes often embrace those preferences. In doing so, this
Article will attempt to explain behavioral tendencies among
professional athletes and how those athletes navigate
preferences when contemplating contractual opportunities. To
begin this analysis, this Article will examine a question framed
strikingly dissonant with popular expectations: Why do many
professional athletes choose to stay in a setting when playing
elsewhere would pay substantially more?
1. Environmental Preference: Remaining in Place
According to many economists, individuals find it
efficient to preserve familiar settings, such as location or
personal contacts, and they attribute appreciable value to that
preservation.201 Similarly, psychologists often maintain that
individuals derive confidence from acquainted surroundings,
and that such confidence influences their decision-making.202
This phenomenon is sometimes described as “regional affinity”
or “hometown bias,” whereby individuals internalize intrinsic
201
See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992) (assessing value of familiarity in decisionmaking among individuals in hiring capacities); see also J.D. Trout & Shahid A.
Buttar, Resurrecting “Death Taxes”: Inheritance, Redistribution, and the Science of
Happiness, 16 J.L. & POL. 765, 802 n.118 (2000) (describing the psychological cost of
those who fled the United States to Canada to avoid service in the Vietnam War).
202
See ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 89 (1996) (noting that
college students perform worse on tests taken in unfamiliar surroundings); see also
Peter J. Cohen, How Shall They Be Known? Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals
and Eyewitness Identification, 16 PACE L. REV. 237, 248 (1996) (describing how
individuals function better in familiar surroundings); D. Michael Risinger & Jeffrey L.
Loop, Three Card Monte, Monty Hall, Modus Operandi and “Offender Profiling”: Some
Lessons of Modern Cognitive Science for the Law of Evidence, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 193,
275 n.434 (2002) (quoting JOHN E. DOUGLAS ET AL., CRIME CLASSIFICATION MANUAL §
132 (1992)) (describing how criminal behavior is in part motivated by confidence
through familiar surroundings).
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value in remaining in a set location, and perceive themselves
as better off by doing so.203
Professional athletes sometimes evince striking value in
the preservation of their surroundings. To illustrate, consider
Edmonton Oilers goaltender Tommy Salo, who, in 2000, agreed
to a three-year contract extension worth $10.4 million.204
Although impressive, his contract likely reflected a market
discount of approximately $4 million, as he declined the
opportunity to pursue unrestricted agency at the earliest date
in his career.205 Salo, however, articulated a preference for
staying in Edmonton, as it reminded him of his native land,
Sweden, and its citizens reminded him of Swedes.206 His
preferences illuminate how a professional athlete may
internalize “wealth” as a concept inclusive of non-economic
terms, including preservation of surroundings.
Similarly, during his nineteen-year career with the
Cincinnati Reds, shortstop Barry Larkin, a Cincinnati native,
identified meaningful subjective value in maintaining existing
conditions. Indeed, during that time, Larkin declined several
more lucrative opportunities to play elsewhere, reasoning that
his continued stay in Cincinnati would exceed in value.207
Intriguingly, the subjective benefit of preserving familiarity
came with a subjective cost: throughout his career, Larkin
endured disapprobation from fellow players and their agents
for accepting less compensation to stay in Cincinnati, as doing
so may have diminished the market value for players of his
Thus, the opportunity cost of forgoing enhanced
ilk.208
compensation may include not only the difference in tangible
203
See Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, The Inadequate Search for
“Adequacy” in Class Actions: A Critique of Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765,
775 n.50 (1998).
204
See Mario Annicchiarico, Stop Sign: Salo Takes Long-Term Lease on Oilers’
Cord Cottage, EDMONTON SUN, Nov. 3, 2000, at SP1.
205
Id. (citing comments by Salo’s agent).
206
Id. (quoting Salo, “[My fiancée and I] both like it here, it’s almost like back
home . . . . Friendly people, a good club and I’m happy to be here. That’s why I signed
the contract.”).
207
See, e.g., Hal McCoy, Reds Sign MVP Larkin Through 2000, DAYTON DAILY
NEWS, Jan. 3, 1996, at 1D (quoting Larkin: “I love Cincinnati—my wife (Lisa) and I are
both are [sic] from here. I’m happy here and I’ve been treated well. The Reds have
been good to me. And I didn’t want to have to test the free agent market after next
season.”).
208
See Hal McCoy, Larkin Feels Asking Price Is Fair, DAYTON DAILY NEWS,
July 20, 2000, at 1D (quoting Larkin: “[B]ecause I signed for less money when I signed
my contracts in the past . . . I caught a lot of grief from guys around the league and
other agents for signing for under value.”).
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compensation, but also the “cost” of coping with hard feelings
from peers who are more interested in financial recompense.
Other professional athletes indicate a preference to stay
in a location because of positive relations with teammates and
coaches, coupled with uncertainty as to whether such relations
may manifest in other settings. To illustrate, when Teemu
Selanne re-signed with the San Jose Sharks in 2002, he
accepted a pay reduction of nearly $3 million from his prior
annual salary of $9 million, even though, as an unrestricted
free agent, a number of teams were offering to pay him more
than $9 million per year.209 At the time, the cash-strapped
Sharks lacked the budgetary resources to pay Selanne his
market value, thus forcing him to compare the subjective value
of remaining a member of the Sharks with the subjective value
of playing elsewhere for more money.210 In explaining his
decision to re-sign, Selanne described how, over the course of
his eleven-year career, he had become increasingly appreciative
of team camaraderie, as well as the feeling of playing for a
“classy organization,” and that such “personal goals” proved
greater in value than additional millions of dollars.211
Reflecting upon Selanne’s decision to forgo several million
dollars, Sharks’ general manager Dean Lombardi noted, “this
is clearly a case where money was not important.”212
In exploring the role of alternative preferences among
professional athletes, loyalty may offer a useful corollary to
positive relations with teammates and coaches.
As a
behavioral concept, “loyalty” refers to a continuous cognitive
affirmation of a particular entity, such as a nation, employer,
or team, and its continuousness results from the feelings of
Continuous cognitive
well-being that it generates.213
affirmation, however, tends to trigger suppression or
obfuscation of negative associations, while promoting the
exaggeration or even invention of favorable aspects.214 More
209
See Robin Brownlee, Selanne’s a Fine Fit in San Jose: Teemu Enjoying Life
in Fast Lane with Sharks, EDMONTON SUN, Oct. 18, 2002, at SP2.
210
Id.
211
Id. (quoting Selanne, “I could have got more money other places, but you
have to see the whole picture.”).
212
See Selanne Spurns East to Stay with Sharks, OTTAWA SUN, July 6, 2002,
at 56.
213
See generally STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY (1974).
214
Id.; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Opening Closed Chambers, 108 YALE L.J.
1087, 1103-04 (questioning the desirability of loyalty when Supreme Court clerks
refrain from discussing their experiences on the Court); Randall Morck, Behavioral
Finance in Corporate Governance-Independent Directors and Non-Executive Chairs,
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simply put, loyal persons tend to ignore the bad and focus on
the good of their object of loyalty, and they do so because it
makes them happy.
Considering the subjective value of happiness
engendered by loyalty, perhaps it should come as no surprise
that certain professional athletes identify a duty of loyalty to
their team as a rationale for accepting less compensation. To
illustrate, consider the decision-making process of St. Louis
Cardinals pitcher Matt Morris, who, in signing a three-year,
$27 million contract in January 2002, accepted a steep
hometown discount.215 At the time, the 26-year old Morris had
recently completed a dominant, 22-win season and was eligible
to become a free agent at the conclusion of the 2002 season,
when he may have obtained twice the salary on the open
market.216 Though acknowledging that he “definitely left
money on the table,” Morris highlighted a sense of loyalty to
the team, particularly since it had “always treated [him] well”
and helped him recuperate from injuries.217 For Morris, this
sense of loyalty may have been worth $27 million, thus
illuminating the material degree of subjective value associable
with alternative preferences.
Professional athletes also occasionally cite family
considerations as a rationale for remaining in a location, as
some are willing to sacrifice meaningful compensation in order
to stay in close proximity to family members. For instance,
during the 2002 MLB season, Tampa Bay Devil Rays’ first
baseman Fred McGriff initially refused to waive a no-trade
clause in his contract after the team had agreed to trade him to
the Chicago Cubs.218 At the time, the Devil Rays were in last
place, while the Cubs were positioning themselves for a World
Series run. Along with the opportunity to join a contending
Harvard Institute Economic Research Discussion Paper 2037, at 3 (2004), available at
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/hier/2004papers/HIER2037.pdf (discussing risks of
loyalty among corporate officers).
215
See Rick Hummel, Morris Says Cards Were Fair in Negotiations on
Contract, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 5, 2002, at 18.
216
Id. In fact, Morris finished third in the balloting for the 2001 Cy Young
Award. See Baseball-Reference.com, Awards Voting for 2001, http://www.baseballreference.com/awards/awards_2001.shtml (last visited Jan. 4, 2006); see also Bernie
Miklasz, Rams Wouldn’t Mind Meeting “Someone New” in Playoffs, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, Jan. 5, 2002, at 3 (describing how Morris “could have made a lot more
money if he’d waited a season to test the free-agent market”).
217
See Hummel, supra note 215.
218
See Stephen Cannella, Inside Baseball, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 6, 2001,
at 70.
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team, the Cubs also offered to raise McGriff’s annual salary
from $6.75 million to $7.25 million, as well as extend his
contract for an additional year at a salary of $8.5 million—an
extraordinary economic conferral for a 39-year old first
baseman.219 McGriff, however, posited the value of remaining
with his wife and two young children as greater in value than
playing for a contender and an enhancement in pay: “I get to
see my family all the time [in Tampa]; I’m happy.”220
Nevertheless, such subjective value apparently contained a
discernable limit: McGriff agreed to the trade 19 days later,
after the Cubs had offered even more money, and apparently to
a sufficient level for McGriff to value waiving his no-trade
clause over remaining with his family in Tampa.221
2. Environmental Preference: Moving to a Preferable
Setting
Professional athletes also choose to play in new locales
that satisfy certain wants over other opportunities that might
pay more. In some instances, professional athletes yearn to
return home, or to be close to family; in others, they seek to
experience characteristics of the setting, such as favorable
weather, cultural offerings, or societal tendencies. Social
psychologists sometimes describe the desire to move to a
particular location as part of one’s “active agen[cy],” whereby
individuals interpret their preferences to be associative of a
new locale.222 As evinced by the decision-making methodology
of certain free agents, active agency appears highly salient in
professional sports.
To illustrate, consider the much-queried decision of
Utah Jazz power forward and unrestricted free agent Donyell
219
Id. Generally, position players in their late thirties and early forties have
difficulty securing such exorbitant contracts. See, e.g., Susan Vinella & John Mangells,
Nothing Personal: The Indians’ Analysis Shows It Makes Little Business Sense to Offer
Long Contracts to Older Players, PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 22, 2003, at A1. But see Gordon
Edes, Dodgers Break Bank to Land Ace Brown, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 13, 1998, at E1
(citing concern by Sandy Alderson, executive vice president of baseball operations for
Major League Baseball, that players in their late thirties and early forties will
eventually obtain lucrative contracts with more regularity).
220
See Bruce Miles, Cubs Not Giving Up Hope on McGriff, CHI. DAILY
HERALD, July 13, 2001, at 1 (emphasis added).
221
See Cannella, supra note 218, at 70. McGriff claimed that he ultimately
agreed to the trade because he “didn’t want to make a hasty decision. I knew I had
time to think about it. I wanted to analyze things.” Id.
222
See Dorothy Rowe, Watching You Watching Me, 10 OPEN MIND 45, 50
(2003).
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Marshall during the 2002 off season: he elected to sign a threeyear, $14 million contract with the Chicago Bulls, even though
he was offered a four-year, $27 million contract to stay with the
Jazz.223 In explaining his decision, Marshall stated a preference
for living in Chicago and experiencing its culture over living in
Salt Lake City and continuing to experience its culture, and
that such a preference was worth more to him than the
significant disparity in pay.224 Paradoxically, that same offseason, Philadelphia 76ers power forward and fellow
unrestricted free agent Matt Harpring signed a four-year
contract with the Jazz worth $18.5 million, or $2.5 million less
than he was offered by the Bulls for the same length of
contract.225 In other words, while Marshall was willing to
accept less money in order to leave Utah for Chicago, Harpring
was willing to take less to move there instead of Chicago.
Similarly influential may be preference for warm
weather, particularly after playing in cold weather
environments for some years. The decision-making process of
nose tackle Fred Smerlas in 1990 demonstrated this concept.
At the time, Smerlas, who had played the previous eleven
seasons with the Buffalo Bills, was an unrestricted free agent
in receipt of three offers: a guaranteed, two-year, $1 million
offer from the New England Patriots; a non-guaranteed, oneyear, $650,000 offer from the Bills; and a non-guaranteed, oneyear, $500,000 offer from the San Francisco 49ers.226 Smerlas
selected the 49ers’ offer, even though it was the least lucrative,
223
See Rich Evans, Marshall Gets Less $$$ to Sign with Chicago, DESERET
NEWS, Aug. 17, 2002, at D5.
224
See Lacy J. Banks, Marshall Not Money Hungry, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 20,
2002, at 99 (quoting Marshall: “One reason was [that Chicago is] centrally located for
myself, for my family as well as for [my fiancée’s] family” and, despite passing up $13
million in leaving the Utah Jazz, “[t]his is a decision that is going to . . . make my
family happy.”); see also Tim Buckley, No Donyell? Marshall’s Agent Says Talks with
Jazz Are Stalled, DESERET MORNING NEWS, July 20, 2002, at D1 (citing comments from
Marshall’s agent that his client was concerned about “quality of life” and that he
expressed a willingness to accept much less in compensation in order to obtain it
elsewhere). The following year, Marshall was traded to the Toronto Raptors. Roman
Modrowski, Rose, Davis Headline Bulls-Raptors Trade, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 30, 2003,
at 114.
225
Lacy J. Banks, Harpring Signs with Jazz, CHI. SUN TIMES, Aug. 16, 2002,
at 143; see also K.C. Johnson, Summer Snub Doesn’t Faze Harpring, CHI. TRIB., Nov.
24, 2002, at 13 (noting that Harpring also rejected a more lucrative contract to stay
with the 76ers).
226
Larry Weisman, Smerlas, 49ers Agree to Terms, USA TODAY, Mar. 29,
1990, at 7C. Although the 49ers’ offer, unlike the offers from the Patriots and Bills,
contained the prospect of a bonus, it lacked the guarantee and total value of the
Patriots’ offer, and the Bills’ base salary was higher. Id. For those reasons, Smerlas’
agent, Jack Mula, acknowledged “we took less money.” Id.
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and even though it lacked a guarantee.227 According to his
representative, Jack Mula, Smerlas valued the “warm weather”
of San Francisco in distinguishing between the offers.228
Neither Smerlas nor other professional athletes are especially
unique in identifying worth in warm weather; scientific data
suggests seasonal and weather changes may affect mood and
happiness, thus motivating individuals to pursue settings most
compatible with weather preferences.229
Other professional athletes prefer settings that ascribe
to normative desires, and that also reflect appealing contrasts
to existing conditions. For instance, when free agent outfielder
Kirk Gibson signed with the Kansas City Royals in 1990, he
declined several offers of greater economic value, reasoning
that, after three years of living in Los Angeles, he most
preferred a relaxed setting in a relatively small city.230
Similarly, he expressly desired an unhurried culture with midwest values.231 Gibson’s choice suggests that active agency may
be fungible, and influenced by mirrored reflections of current
conditions.
Such a disposition appears corroborative of
findings that individuals often proscribe value to new settings,
simply because those settings contrast to existing and
unfavorable circumstances.232 This is sometimes called the
“grass is always greener” phenomenon.233

227

Id. Unlike in the MLB, the NBA, or the NHL, player contracts in the NFL
may be non-guaranteed. See generally Adam W. Heller, Creating a Win-Win Situation
Through Collective Bargaining: The NFL Salary Cap, 7 SPORTS LAW. J. 375, 389-97
(2000).
228
E-mail from Jack Mula, Chief Administrative Counsel, New England
Patriots, to the author (Mar. 30, 2005) (on file with author).
229
See Leo Sher, Seasons and the Brain, 358 LANCET 2092 (2001) (describing
research findings pertaining to “seasonal affective disorder,” a disorder causing
individuals to become depressed when exposed to prolonged cold or dreary weather);
see also Timo Partonen & Jouko Löonnqvist, Seasonal Affective Disorder, 352 LANCET
1369 (1998) (recommending greater exposure to warm weather and sunlight as best
remedies to seasonal affective disorder).
230
See Royals Sign Kirk Gibson, UNITED PRESS INT’L, Dec. 1, 1990 (Lexis
News Wire).
231
Id. (quoting Gibson, “I guess I’ve always been kind of a country boy.
Coming from Los Angeles, I know I’ll never have to sit in six lanes of traffic at 1 o’clock
in the afternoon to go six miles in 35 minutes.”).
232
See, e.g., Barbara Millar, Relocation: Where the Grass Is Always Greener,
NURS. TIMES, June 14, 2001, at 28, 28-29 (2001) (describing methodology of nurses
when they seek to move to new hospitals and new cities); Edilberto O. Pelausa, Moving
to America: Is the Grass Really Greener?, 31 J. OTOLARYNGOLOGY 65, 73-75 (2002)
(discussing dissonance between expectations and realities for foreign otolaryngologists
who move to the United States).
233
Miller, supra note 232, at 29 (on file with author).
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The allure of playing on a championship-contending
team also attracts professional athletes to sacrifice fortune.
This is especially apparent among those professional athletes
nearing the end of their careers. Consider, for instance, the
decision of unrestricted free agent Alonzo Mourning to sign a
four-year, $22 million contract with the New Jersey Nets in
2002.234 Though he was presented with a more lucrative offer
from the Dallas Mavericks, Mourning believed that playing
with the Nets would provide a greater probability of winning a
championship.235 In the twilight of his career, Mourning
identified particular value in this motivation, as he deemed a
championship the critically missing piece of his professional
For that reason, Mourning expressed a
biography.236
willingness to sacrifice meaningful economic remuneration in
exchange for enhanced probability of team success.237
Professional athletes also seek new settings that might
enhance perceived personality traits. To illustrate, consider
the decision-making process of pitcher Eddie Guardado, who,
as an unrestricted free agent in 2003, opted to sign with the
Seattle Mariners for less compensation than he was offered by
teams in larger media markets, including the Boston Red Sox
and the Chicago Cubs.238 Significantly, Guardado articulated a
predilection for an environment in which he would “not [be in]
the limelight.”239 Similarly, he aspired a setting where media
commentary would prove less hurtful to his family.240 Thus,
Guardado appeared highly cognizant of the relationship
between playing environment and happiness, and he placed
corresponding value in that recognition when choosing between
offers.
234

Charlie Nobles, Mourning Shows the Rust, but Dreams About the Ring,
N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2003, at D2.
235
See Mike Celizic, Give Nets Credit for Major Coup, MSNBC SPORTS, July
11, 2003, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/3074478/.
236
See Nobles, supra note 234.
237
See Celizic, supra note 235 (quoting Mourning: “[I]t’s not just about the
money . . . . It’s about winning, too.”). For a similar instance, consider Brett Hull’s
decision to sign with the Detroit Red Wings in 2001. He signed for less because he
perceived the opportunity to win a Stanley Cup as more valuable than millions extra in
compensation. See Hull Joins Hasek, Robitaille in Detroit, ESPN.COM, Aug. 23, 2001,
http://espn.go.com/nhl/news/2001/0821/1242288.html.
238
See Red Sox to Hire Francona Today, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 4, 2003, at D2;
Mike Dodd, Setup Men Face High-Pressure Relief with Low Pay, USA TODAY, Mar. 26,
2004, at 1C. Guardado signed a three-year, $13 million contract with the Mariners.
Dodd, supra, at 1C.
239
Dodd, supra note 238, at 1C.
240
See Red Sox To Hire Francona Today, supra note 238, at D2.
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Lastly, by externally imposing alternate preferences,
the families of professional athletes may also influence
decision-making of free agent opportunities.
Take, for
instance, defensive end Sean Jones, who, as an unrestricted
free agent in 1996, attracted significant interest from NFL
teams.241 He ultimately chose to sign with the Green Bay
Packers, even though he was offered more money by other
teams.242 Jones revealed that his choice was “pretty much [his]
wife’s decision,” as she required that he to play in a city where
there would be comparatively few “late night” options for
players.243 Indeed, Mrs. Jones wanted assurance that her
husband “would be home at a reasonable time of night.”244
3. Risk Aversion
A separate, non-geographic rational preference also
deserves discussion: risk aversion, or the willingness to pay
more money (or accept less money) to avoid participation in a
risky activity, even when the expected value of the activity is
favorable.245 As captured by the adage, “A bird in hand is worth
two in the bush,” risk-aversion signifies that the prospect of
losing a dollar already owned weighs more heavily than the
More
chance of gaining a dollar not yet owned.246
241
David Aldridge, Green Bay’s Low-Key High Life; Big-time Athletes Adjust to
Small Town, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 1996, at F3.
242
Id.
243
Id.
244
Id. For perhaps a similar illustration of familial influence, consider
remarks by former Boston Red Sox great Johnny Pesky, for whom Fenway Park’s
“Pesky Pole” is named, concerning his decision to sign with the Red Sox in 1940:

Back then, you could sign with anybody—there was no draft yet. There were
a number of teams interested in me, and some offered more money than
Boston. My mother and father wanted me to sign with the Red Sox, though,
because their scout brought her flowers when he came to the house—and
bourbon for my father. They were immigrants, and even though it was the
Depression, that was more important than the extra money. I’m glad it
worked out the way it did.
David Laurila, Interview with Johnny Pesky, RED SOX NATION, May 29, 2004,
http://www.redsoxnation.net/forums/index.php?showtopic=5219.
245
See RICHARD A. BREALEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO RISK AND RETURN FROM
COMMON STOCKS 47-54 (1969) (explaining the relationship between risk and value);
Lynn M. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in
the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE. L.J. 701, 736 (1999) (describing how
individuals with greater tolerance for risk can reap benefits by accepting risks avoided
by others).
246
See JOHN MUELLER, CAN FINANCIAL ASSETS BEAT SOCIAL SECURITY? NOT
IN THE REAL WORLD 4 (1997), available at http://heartland.org/pdf/80785B.pdf. See also
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formalistically then, a risk-averse individual would prefer
suffering a certain harm of $100 to suffering a harm of $1,000
with a 10 percent probability of occurring, in spite of their
identical expected values.247 Such decision-making manifests
itself across economic, political, and legal spectrums, and
affects both individual and institutional choices.248
Professional athletes occasionally evince risk aversion
in explaining their acquiescence to below-market contract
offers. Cleveland Browns quarterback Kelly Holcomb is one
such player. Prior to the start of the 2002 NFL season,
Holcomb served as the primary backup quarterback to starting
quarterback Tim Couch.249 At that time, Holcomb was 29 years
old and appeared destined for a career as a backup
quarterback.250 The Browns offered him a two-year contract
extension worth nearly $2.2 million251, which essentially
reflected the going-rate for backup quarterbacks.252
Significantly, Holcomb was set to become an
unrestricted free agent at the end of the 2002 season.
Considering that typically between 10 and 20 percent of
starting quarterbacks miss more than five games each year due
to injury, and that a similarly meaningful percentage play
poorly and are benched, Holcomb, like any backup quarterback,

DONALD N. MCCLOSKEY, THE APPLIED THEORY OF PRICE 65-70 (2d ed. 1985) (providing
economic description of risk aversion).
247
See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 961, 1074 (2001) (explaining risk aversion in the insurance context). See also
Mark F. Grady, Proximate Cause and the Law of Negligence, 69 IOWA L. REV. 363, 36667 (1984) (discussing how risk aversion among townspeople affects their preferences for
local policies).
248
See Richard Birke, Reconciling Loss Aversion and Guilty Pleas, 1999 UTAH
L. REV. 205, 209 (1999) (reconciling risk aversion among criminal defendants with
insufficient plea bargain offers by prosecution); Albert J. Boro, Jr., Banking Disclosure
Regimes for Regulating Speculative Behavior, 74 CAL. L. REV. 431, 451 (1986)
(explaining how fiduciary duties and the threat of legal liability encourages risk
aversion among institutional investors); David A. Yalof, Dress Rehearsal Politics and
the Case of Earmarked Judicial Nominees, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 691, 697 (2005)
(discussing risk aversion of President Bill Clinton when selecting judicial nominees for
federal appellate positions).
249
American Football Conference Team Notes, SPORTING NEWS, July 29, 2002,
at 51.
250
Id. (describing Holcomb in rather modest terms, “Kelly Holcomb is a steady
backup who won’t win games but won’t lose them either”).
251
See Mary Kay Cabot, Former Browns Pay Disorderly Conduct Fine, PLAIN
DEALER, Apr. 30, 2002, at D7 (noting that the contract included a signing bonus of
$325,000 and base salaries of $825,000 and $975,000, for a total value of $2,175,000).
252
See, e.g., Mark Eckel, Brian’s Song, TIMES OF TRENTON, Aug. 7, 2005, at
C9 (noting that, in 2005, NFL back-up quarterbacks tend to make at least $1.4 million
per year).
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could have declined a market-value extension, and chosen
instead to “gamble” that Couch would either suffer injury or
play poorly, thus elevating Holcomb to the starting position.253
Indeed, in light of established NFL precedent, just one start
may have offered the opportunity to catapult his market value:
quarterback Rob Johnson had only one start in three seasons
with the Jacksonville Jaguars between 1996 and 1998, but
played very well in the start, prompting the Buffalo Bills to
trade for him, and sign him to a five-year, $25 million
contract.254
On the other hand, Holcomb was presented with a
contract worth almost $2.2 million, and chances were, he would
not play more than a few plays during the 2002 season, and
thus not elevate his market value. Indeed, Couch had proven
remarkably durable, not missing a single start in the 2001
season.255 Moreover, Holcomb recognized the prospect of injury
in practice or otherwise during the 2002 season, and would
have regretted not signing the extension in the event of such
occurrence.256 Presented with these risk assessment variables,
Holcomb elected to sign the contract extension.257
During the last preseason game for the Browns in 2002,
Holcomb may have suddenly felt regret. In that game, Couch
suffered an elbow injury that would cause him to miss the first
two games of the regular season. Holcomb went on to start
those two games, as well as play in most of the season’s third
game, and would play extraordinarily well, throwing nine
touchdowns and just two interceptions, while leading the NFL
in Quarterback Rating.258 When confronted with speculation as
253

See, e.g., Will McDonough, Ironic Twists in Bledsoe Saga, BOSTON GLOBE,
Apr. 28, 2002, at D2 (noting that one or two starting quarterbacks is typically injured
in the preseason, and that several others tend to “fail miserably”).
254
See Larry Weisman, Bills’ Playbook a Work in Progress, USA TODAY, Aug.
5, 1998, at 10C.
255
See ESPN.com, Green Bay Packers, # 2 Tim Couch-QB,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/players /stats?statsId=4649 (last visited Jan. 4, 2006).
256
For instance, during the 1994 NFL season, Tampa Bay Buccaneers backup
quarterback Trent Dilfer was set to ascend to the starting quarterback position, but
was injured in practice, thus delaying his ascension. See David Elfin, Growing Pains:
Rookies Schuler, Dilfer Find Life Tough in NFL, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1994, at C1.
257
See Tony Grossi, Holcomb Takes What’s Dealt: Backup Quarterback Doesn’t
Regret Signing Contract Extension, PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 17, 2002, at C14.
258
See id. “Quarterback rating” is a composite statistic based on four criteria:
1) percentage of completions per attempt; 2) average yards gained per attempt;
3) percentage of touchdown passes per attempt; and 4) percentage of interceptions per
attempt.
See
NFL
Quarterback
Rating
Formula,
NFL
News,
http://www.nfl.com/news/981202qbrate.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2006).
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to how much more money he could have earned had he declined
the contract extension and pursued free agency, Holcomb noted
a conscious internalization of risk: “It’s that old saying, one
bird in hand is better than two in the bush.”259 In other words,
by signing the contract extension, Holcomb prescribed
subjective value to the nullification of risk, and that subjective
value was worth more to him than the difference in objective
value between the contract extension and his prospective free
agent status, discounted by risk of injury, poor performance, or
other impairments of play.260
Risk aversion also emerges when players attempt to
forecast market changes. For instance, when former Red Sox
outfielder Mike Greenwell declined to elect for free agency in
1994, and instead surprisingly agreed to a two-year, $7.3
million contract extension, he highlighted a market strategy
Specifically, Greenwell
based on his risk preferences.261
anticipated that because of public outrage associated with the
baseball players’ strike in 1994, fans would soon turn away
from baseball in droves, thus contracting the value of the game
and leading to diminished player salaries.262 Consequently,
Greenwell perceived a discounted contract in an existing
market as more valuable than a market-value contract in an
uncertain and future market.
Unfortunately for Greenwell, his market projections
would prove largely erroneous. Even though MLB player
salaries dipped 1.3 percent from 1994 to 1995,263 they increased
by 3.5 percent from 1995 to 1996, followed by a 17.0 percent
Nevertheless, his expressed
surge from 1996 to 1997.264
259

Id.
Recent economic analysis suggests that risk aversion among professional
athletes also affects contracting of off-court responsibilities, such as extent of team
monitoring of player activities. See Örn B. Bodvarsson & Raymond T. Brastow, Do
Employers Pay for Consistent Performance?: Evidence from the NBA, 36 ECON. INQUIRY
145, 152-58 (1998).
261
See Greenwell Remains in Red Sox Tradition, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1994,
at B12.
262
See Nick Cafardo, Greenwell Not Holding a Grudge, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr.
3, 1995, at 46 (quoting Greenwell: “People were wondering . . . why I took the offer they
made. Well, I’m not that stupid. I’m a little smarter than people think. I knew what
was coming. Right now, I’m extremely happy I signed the contract that I did when I
did.”).
263
See Baseball Salary Decline, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 1995, at D6 (also noting
that while many players took pay cuts following the strike of 1994, the top stars
continued to observe their salaries surge considerably).
264
See Erik Brady & David Leon Moore, Big Sports, Bigger Bucks: Just How
High Can Players’ Salaries Go?, USA TODAY, Apr. 3, 1997, at 1A.
260
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rationale for negotiating a below-market value contract
extension suggested a conscious, tactical strategy based on risk
preferences.
C.

Evidence of Cognitive Biases and Heuristics

The preceding subsection described alternative
preferences among professional athletes when contemplating
employment opportunities. In doing so, it largely endorsed
rational choice theory: individuals appear to rank preferences,
and then, as reflected in their choices, maximize those
preferences in their decision-making process. Thus, when
professional athletes choose a “discount” offer, it simply reflects
a conscious ranking of non-monetary preferences ahead of
remunerative preferences.
Doubtless, a rational choice model strikes an appealing
rubric, since it more broadly suggests that individuals act
rationally when making decisions, and that such decisions
reflect conscious preferences.
Moreover, given societal
skepticism towards the intellectual capacity of most
professional athletes,265 typical individuals might infer
confidence from the capacity of professional athletes to engage
in rational decision-making. In short, based on the rationalchoices of professional athletes, individuals appear to possess
not only the capacity to navigate through difficult professional
decisions, but also the tendency to select the “optimal” choice.
This analysis, however, is incomplete.
Indeed, as
discussed in Section III, cognitive biases and heuristics,
unbeknownst to decision-makers, frequently disturb decisionmaking processes. Perhaps then it should come as no surprise
that professional athletes appear likewise influenced by choice
distortions.
1. Framing Effects
Framing effects suggest that varied wording of equallyvaluable options can induce individuals into valuing them
differently.266 How might framing effects influence professional
265
See Timothy Davis, The Myth of the Superspade: The Persistence of Racism
in College Athletics, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 615, 631 (1995) (describing how, even when
they evince high intellectual capacity, collegiate athletes are frequently discouraged by
scholastic advisors from taking “hard” classes, and instead enrolled in less burdensome
courses).
266
See discussion supra p. 1470 and accompanying notes.
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athletes when selecting employment opportunities? Consider
the influence of team negotiators, such as general managers or
owners, and how some adroitly utilize invention, red herrings,
and props to spawn illusory distinctions.
Framing effects among professional teams are especially
evident in the NBA, where salaries have maximum limits,
meaning that teams often extend identical offers to premiere
free agents.267 Without the potential of distinguishing financial
terms, NBA teams routinely employ aggressive recruiting
tactics, and these tactics sometimes amplify trivial distinctions.
For instance, when the Chicago Bulls courted unrestricted free
agents in the summer of 2001, they arranged for a band,
assorted mascots, and numerous front office officials to greet
each player upon his arrival at O’Hare International Airport.268
Bulls’ general manager Jerry Krause had hoped that such a
marketing strategy would frame the Bulls as a franchise of
particular “substance” and player care.269
Similarly, to promote distinction in relative levels of
interest, NBA general managers are known to call free agents
at the very first moment when teams are allowed to contact
free agents. This moment usually occurs at 12:01 A.M. of an
early July morning.270 Occasionally, this strategy appears
influential in free agents’ decision-making. For instance, in
explaining his decision to sign with the New York Knicks in
2004, free agent guard Jamal Crawford highlighted an
enthusiastic phone call that he had received from New York
Knicks’ general manager Isiah Thomas at the very first
moment when teams could contact free agents.271 Crawford
267

See discussion supra pp. 1488-89 and accompanying notes.
See Lacy J. Banks, Krause Made the Right Call Targeting Jones, CHI. SUNTIMES, July 14, 2000, at 138.
269
Id. This strategy did not work, however, as none of the five primary free
agents Krause pursued (i.e., Tim Duncan, Tracy McGrady, Grant Hill, Eddie Jones,
and Tim Thomas) signed with the Bulls, and they instead chose identical offers from
other teams. See Fred Mitchell, Local Agent Discounts Talk of Anti-Bulls Conspiracy,
CHI. TRIB., Dec. 12, 2000, at N3.
270
This date varies, depending upon the NBA calendar, but usually occurs
between July 1 and July 15.
271
See Mike Lupica, Isiah Giving Crawford His Shot to Score with Fans,
DAILY NEWS (New York), Nov. 3, 2004, at 74. Perhaps more often, however, this
strategy proves immaterial.
See, e.g., Mark Montieth, O’Neal to Visit Spurs,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, July 2, 2003, at 1D (noting that although Isiah Thomas personally
called unrestricted free agents Jermaine O’Neal and Reggie Miller, neither of them
signed with the Knicks); Liz Robbins, Kidd’s a Free Agent, and Phones Ring, N.Y.
TIMES, July 2, 2003, at D6 (describing unsuccessful efforts by the Dallas Mavericks and
San Antonio Spurs to recruit free agent Jason Kidd, and that such efforts entailed
calling him at 12:01 A.M.).
268
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regarded the call as instrumental in helping him distinguish
between identical offers.272
Framing effects also emerge in other professional sports
contexts, albeit more conjecturally. For instance, when the
New York Mets successfully pursued free agent pitcher Pedro
Martinez in 2004, Mets’ general manager Omar Minaya is
thought to have intimated to Martinez that since he, like
Martinez, was of Dominican descent, Martinez could “trust”
him more than Theo Epstein, Minaya’s counterpart on the
Boston Red Sox and for whom Martinez had been playing.273
Such fact patterns undermine the rational choice model, and
suggest that choices may not reflect a pristine maximization of
utility or relative strength of preferences, but rather
vulnerability to unappreciated factors, such as sales pitches
and manipulative overtures.
2. Confirmation Bias
Similarly influential is the effect of confirmation bias,
whereby individuals are subject to ignore or discount
information that challenges existing beliefs.274 This disposition
occasionally arises when professional athletes encounter a
uniquely positive experience on a particular team, and are
thereafter
prone
to
positively
interpret
ambiguous
circumstances and to dismiss negative associations. Since they
are prone to misinterpret signals and cues, professional
athletes affected by confirmation bias may unknowingly
dismiss
salient—and
thus
valuable—distinguishing
characteristics.

272

Lupica, supra note 270, at 74.
See Filip Bondy, Pedro Plays N.Y. Way in City, Everyone Has Own Set of
Rules, DAILY NEWS (New York), Dec. 17, 2004, at 104; see also Gordon Edes, Martinez
Is Starting Already in Mets Camp, He’s Starting Already!, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 16,
2005, at F1 (citing remarks by Martinez that he gave his word to Minaya while he
could not do the same to Epstein, who he believed—in spite of facts supporting the
opposite conclusion—was not genuinely interested in re-signing him).
274
See Hanson & Kysar, The Problem of Market Manipulation, supra note 16,
at 647-50. A corollary to confirmation bias is “self-serving” or “egocentric” biases,
whereby individuals interpret information in a way that disproportionately favors their
own position. Unlike confirmation bias, however, self-serving or egocentric biases are
likely consciously present. See Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation, supra note 55,
at 206 n.199 (noting that these biases may increase plaintiffs’ risk in seeking frivolous
litigation); see also Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining
Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON PERSPECTIVES 109 (1997)
(discussing the impact of self-serving biases on settlements).
273
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To illustrate, consider the events that led to Jermaine
O’Neal’s decision to re-sign with the Indiana Pacers in 2003.
O’Neal’s NBA career began in 1996, when he was drafted by
the Portland Trailblazers.275 After four unspectacular seasons,
O’Neal was traded to the Pacers.276 As a Pacer, O’Neal
developed a close bond with head coach Isiah Thomas, who
devoted much of his time to O’Neal and helped him become a
star. In fact, O’Neal would call Thomas his “father figure.”277
Besides his on-court instruction, Thomas would also serve
O’Neal as an emotional buffer, as best evidenced by Thomas’
counseling of O’Neal after the player’s stepfather attempted
suicide by shooting himself in the head—in O’Neal’s presence—
in 2002.278
The O’Neal-Thomas relationship emerged as mutually
beneficial. Indeed, O’Neal would often rush to the defense of
Thomas, whose coaching strategies were widely-criticized and
whose teams often appeared underachieving.279 For instance,
when doubts were raised of Thomas’ competence, O’Neal would
regularly characterize his coach as a victim of unrealistic
expectations, saddled by prior management decisions that
created an on-going re-building process.280 Such comments
bewildered many observers, as the Pacers were generally
regarded as one of the league’s most talented teams, and one
275
See Ken Vance, Blazers President Not Afraid of Change, COLUMBIAN
(Vancouver, WA), June 30, 1996, at C1.
276
See Brian Meehan, O’Neal Becoming a Force on the Court for Indiana,
OREGONIAN, Nov. 26, 2000, at C11.
277
See Lacy Banks, Pacers in Limbo After Firing Thomas, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Aug. 29, 2003, at 166 (quoting O’Neal: “[Thomas] was more than a coach to me. He
was like a father.”); Mark Montieth, Lineup Shuffle Puts Strickland on Court,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 7, 2003, at 4D (quoting O’Neal: “It’s like a father-son
relationship”); Christian Red, O’Neal Gets Over Axing of Thomas, DAILY NEWS (New
York), Feb. 4, 2004, at 48.
278
See Sekou Smith, Rising to the Occasion, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Mar. 25,
2003, at 1D (describing how Thomas went to the emergency room to counsel O’Neal the
night of his step-father’s attempted suicide).
279
See Bob Ryan, As Game 5 Beckons, Consider These Salient Topics on the
Indiana-Boston Series 5 Points—Ok, Actually Five Observations on Basketball with a
Bonus Entertainment Topic Thrown In, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 29, 2003, at F1
(describing the Pacers as one of the worst-coached teams in the NBA, particularly with
their bizarre substitution patterns); see also Steve Bulpett, Celts Earn Playoff Berth by
Default, BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 12, 2004, at 82 (criticizing Thomas for his coaching
strategies against inferior Celtics teams that nevertheless beat the Thomas-coached
Pacers).
280
See Mark Monteith, O’Neal: I’ll Play Only for Thomas, INDIANAPOLIS STAR,
May 2, 2003, at 1D (quoting O’Neal: “This is still a learning process. Isiah’s got a team
competing at a high level with a lot of guys who hadn’t played in the past. Isiah
inherited a team that he didn’t put together but he’s winning with it.”).

2006]

PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES

1513

led by seasoned veterans, such as Reggie Miller and Brad
Miller; a “rebuilding team” they were not.281
The 2002-03 season would prove to be a pivotal one for
the O’Neal-Thomas relationship. First, consider that the
Pacers lost 19 of their last 30 regular season games, and then,
in a dismal showing, lost to the Boston Celtics in the first
round of the 2003 NBA Playoffs.282 Following the playoff series,
media and even Pacers’ players harshly criticized Thomas for
his coaching strategies.283 Then, in May 2003, Pacers team
president Donnie Walsh announced that Thomas would not
receive a contract extension, a significant proclamation
considering that Thomas had only one year left on his four-year
contract, and a team declination of a coaching extension
typically foretells a forthcoming coaching dismissal.284
Only making matters more dubious for Thomas, in early
July 2003, the Pacers hired a new president of basketball
operations, Larry Bird—a personal and professional archrival
of Thomas—who immediately announced major organizational
changes on the horizon.285 Along those lines, speculation
quickly arose that Bird would replace Thomas with Rick
Carlisle, Bird’s close friend and former Detroit Pistons’ head
coach.286 In fact, only a year earlier, Bird had opined that if
Carlisle, rather than Thomas, were the Pacers’ coach, the team
would “be 10 to 20 percent better.”287 Accordingly, by all
objective measures, the future of Thomas as Pacers’ head coach
appeared very bleak in July 2003.
For O’Neal, Thomas’ impending demise proved of great
relevance, as he was set to become an unrestricted free agent
281
See, e.g., Al Iannazzone, Isiah Pining for Pacers, THE RECORD (Bergen
County, NJ), Feb. 3, 2004, at S6 (describing Pacers 2002-03 squad as one that, “by most
accounts, underachieved”); Doug Smith, Raptors “Open to All Discussions” at Draft,
HAMILTON SPECTATOR (Ontario, Canada), May 28, 2003, at E5 (describing Pacers as
“underachieving”).
282
See Peter May, Doubts on Thomas, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 30, 2003, at F8.
283
Id. (identifying complaints among players concerning unpredictable
substitution patterns, with players receiving significant minutes in one game, and then
no minutes in the next).
284
Id.
285
See Sekou Smith, Off and Running: Bird Identifies Pacers’ Faults, Wants
Solutions, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, July 12, 2003, at 1D [hereinafter Smith, Off and
Running].
286
See Mark Monteith, “Isiah Thomas Is the Coach”; Carlisle Says He’s
Pursuing TV Analyst Jobs, Not Pacers’ Position, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, July 13, 2003, at
5C.
287
See Jackie MacMullan, For Playoffs, Bird Still a Green Backer, BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 18, 2002, at E1.
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on July 1, 2003.288 Despite Thomas’ precarious status, O’Neal
expressed interest in re-signing with the Pacers, but as a
precondition, he insisted that Thomas remain the coach.289 In
response, Bird stated only that he had no immediate plans to
make a coaching change, which O’Neal interpreted as
unwavering confidence by Bird in Thomas.290 In contrast, most
observers not only interpreted Bird’s comments as lukewarm
support, but that Thomas would be retained only until O’Neal
re-signed or signed elsewhere.291 Nevertheless, O’Neal chose to
re-sign with the Pacers—a mere five days after Bird’s hiring.292
Less than a month later, Bird fired Thomas as head
coach, and replaced him with Carlisle.293 Observers described
the move as one of the most predictable coaching changes in
recent NBA history.294 O’Neal perceived it a bit differently. He
expressed shock and displeasure, and claimed that he had been
“deceived” by Bird into signing the contract extension.295 He
also stated that he would not have re-signed had he known
that Thomas was going to be fired.296
O’Neal’s decision-making process appeared strikingly
incongruous with both available information and his stipulated
preferences for re-signing with the Pacers. Along those lines,
O’Neal appeared to discount myriad informational sources that
challenged his core belief, namely that Thomas would remain
as his head coach, mentor, and father-figure. Even arguably
ambiguous information, such as speculation of Bird’s fondness
288
See David DuPree, Big Names Are in Position for Free-Agent Free-for-All,
USA TODAY, July 1, 2003, at 6C.
289
See Mark Monteith, Pacers’ Star Player Welcomes New Boss, INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, July 12, 2003, at 8D [hereinafter Monteith, Pacers’ Star Welcomes New Boss].
290
Monteith, Pacers’ Star Player Welcomes New Boss, supra note 289; Smith,
Off and Running, supra note 285.
291
See, e.g., Jemal Horton, Bird and Thomas See a Future Together,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, July 12, 2003, at 1A (noting “myriad reasons to figure that
Thomas’ days as the Pacers’ head coach were numbered”).
292
Mark Monteith, O’Neal Makes It Official: Pacers Forward Signs Huge 7Year Contract, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, July 17, 2003, at 1D.
293
See Dave Lewandowski, Isiah Ousted, Carlisle Courted, INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, Aug. 28, 2003, at 1A.
294
See, e.g., Michael Lee, Inside the NBA, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug. 29, 2003,
(regarding move as not surprising to any objective observer); Tom Enlund, Carlisle
Clearly Was Saving Himself for Pacers All Along, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept. 7,
2003, at 19C (stating that Thomas’ “days with the team were numbered” following the
hiring of Bird).
295
See Bob Kravitz, O’Neal Could Have Handled the Truth, INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, Aug. 29, 2003, at 1D.
296
See Patrick Hruby, Coming Attractions; NBA Ready to Go Reel-to-Reel in
2003-04, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2003, at C1.
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for Carlisle, was dismissed by O’Neal with ease. Thus, O’Neal
appeared to unknowingly impair his own capacity to maximize
choice: though he enunciated meaningful subjective value in
playing for the Pacers only if Thomas was the coach, he either
disregarded or misread evidence indicating that Thomas would
not be the coach. Thus, when Thomas was dismissed, such
impairment of preference-maximization dismayed O’Neal, as
he had unknowingly suppressed the internalization of salient
and distinguishing characteristics.
3. Optimism Bias
Optimism bias likewise provides a useful mode of
heuristic analysis by which to gauge decision-making among
professional athletes, and how they may not always utilize
rational choice. As discussed in Section III, optimism bias
reflects the tendency of individuals to assume that general
risks do not apply with equal force to themselves.297 Thus,
when contemplating employment opportunities, might
professional athletes overestimate the probability of positive
outcomes and underestimate the probability of negative
outcomes?
Evidence for optimism bias sometimes emerges when
professional athletes weigh the relative risk of incentive-laden
contracts versus guaranteed contracts, with the former
naturally offering greater potential for reward—and loss. For
instance, consider the choice of New Orleans Saints’ running
back Ricky Williams in 1999 to agree to an eight-year contract
worth between $11 million and $68 million, depending upon his
capacity to reach certain incentives.298 At the time, Williams
was the fifth overall selection in the 1999 NFL Draft and was
negotiating his first NFL contract. As a useful juxtaposition to
Williams’ decision-making process, consider that of fellow
rookie running back Edgerrin James, who was selected by the
Indianapolis Colts with the fourth overall selection and was
likewise negotiating his first NFL contract.299 In striking
contrast to Williams’ incentive-laden contract, James agreed to
a seven-year contract worth between $44 million and $49

297

See discussion supra pp. 1471-72.
Mark Wiedmer, Maybe Ricky Should Lose Master P, CHATTANOOGA TIMES
FREE PRESS, Aug. 26, 1999, at D1.
299
See id.
298
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million, with incentives primarily affecting Williams’ potential
to void the last year of the contract.300
For two players selected at almost the same point in the
NFL Draft, the Williams and James contracts appeared of
exceptionally disparate values.
In fact, performance
projections estimated that Williams would earn at least $30
million less than James over the course of the contract.301
Indeed, for Williams to obtain much of his annual salary, he
needed to amass at least 1,600 rushing yards each season, a
feat that had only been accomplished by 15 players in the
NFL’s 134-year history, and only once by a Saints’ running
back in the franchise’s 33-year history.302 As a result of his
apparent “bad gamble,” Williams bore the brunt of considerable
ridicule.303
In explaining his decision, Williams reasoned that
because he believed that he should have been the number one
overall selection in the NFL Draft—and thus have warranted a
more lucrative contract—the only way for him “to make that
kind of money” was to agree to such a heavily-leveraged
contract.304 As to the contract’s seemingly quixotic performance
thresholds, Williams appeared undeterred, reasoning that if he
performed to his potential, he would readily attain them.305
Further suggestive of optimism bias, Williams maintained this
confidence even after seriously spraining his ankle a week prior
to the start of his rookie season.306 Separately, Williams
rationalized the contract by stating that he would use off-field
promotional earnings to offset any opportunity costs triggered

300

See News Summaries, Colts Sign James to Seven-Year Deal, SPORTS
NETWORK, Aug. 13, 1999.
301
See Wiedmer, supra note 297. See also Peter King, Inside the NFL, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 23, 1999, at 48 (noting that, based on probable performance, James
would likely earn $11 million more than Williams over their first three seasons).
302
King, supra note 301, at 48; Rick Reilly, Ricky Williams, You Got Taken,
but Good, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 9, 1999, at 100 (describing the contract as the
worst contract in NFL history).
303
See, e.g., Ron Borges, Williams Giving Saints, Fans New Incentive, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 20, 1999, at D4 (noting ridicule from agents); Reilly, supra note 302, at
100; Michael Silver, Rappin’ on the Door, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 19, 1999, at 82
(citing mocking commentary from agents and NFL executives of the contract).
304
See Camping with Ricky, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Aug. 5, 1999, at
D2.
305
Id.
306
See Don Pierson, Williams, Saints Go Limping In, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 27,
1999, at N1 (citing remarks by Williams that he believed he would obtain the 1,600rushing-yard-per-season milestone even if he missed two out of the sixteen regular
season games).
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by unobtainable incentives (without apparently realizing that
such off-field earnings would have been available irrespective
of contract type).307
As predicted by most observers, Williams’ decision
proved remarkably unwise. Though he ranked among the top
10 running backs in rushing yards during his first three
seasons, he failed to reach most of the onerous performance
standards necessary for incentive payment. As a result, he
earned far below his market value.308 This proved most evident
in his third season, when despite setting his franchise’s fourthhighest single-season record for rushing yards, and despite
being named his team’s “most valuable player,” he earned only
$389,000.309 To put this figure in perspective, consider that
thirty-three of his fifty Saints’ teammates earned more that
season,310 or that James—who rushed for fewer yards—earned
slightly more than $7 million.311
The costly effect of Williams’ optimism bias begs an
important question for assessing decision-making among
professional athletes: How can player representatives diminish
optimism bias and other cognitive biases when their clients
seek patently unfavorable terms?
In the case of Williams, a fatal negotiating defect may
have existed to prevent such diminishment, as his
representative, Percy Miller, had never before represented a
professional football player.312 Indeed, Miller himself appeared
the victim of optimism bias, as he dauntlessly assigned the
drafting of technical, contractual language to a personal aide
who had never before drafted a contract.313 Nevertheless, more
seasoned agents may prove capable in discouraging players
from desiring detrimental agreements.314 In the alternative,
307

See Kevin B. Blackistone, Give Saints’ Williams Credit for His Play-for-Pay
Contract, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 15, 1999, at 5B (quoting Williams: “I’m going
to make a lot of money off the field, and I can use that as my salary.”).
308
See Silver, supra note 303.
309
See Brad Townsend, Unmasked: His Social Phobia in the Open, Williams
Tries to Pull off Move, Dallas Morning News, Aug. 12, 2002, at 1B. See also New
Orleans
Saints
Total
Rushing
Records,
http://www.neworleanssaints.com/
custompage.cfm?pageid=72 (last visited Jan. 4, 2006).
310
See Townsend, supra note 309.
311
Id.; USA Today Salary Database: Edgerrin James, Dec. 10, 2003,
http://asp.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/salaries/playerdetail.aspx?lname=J&player=
1162.
312
See Reilly, supra note 302.
313
See Silver, supra note 303 (describing work by Leland Hardy).
314
See generally Willenbacher, supra note 142 (discussing norms for agent
behavior).
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and as vividly illustrated by Williams, professional athletes
may fail to internalize critical components of the decisionmaking process, and thus ultimately pursue the non-optimal
strategy.
4. Hindsight Bias and Regret Aversion
Hindsight bias also appears salient in the decisionmaking of professional athletes. As discussed in Section III,
hindsight bias refers to the tendency to overestimate
anticipated fruition of a particular event.315 In the context of
professional sports, hindsight bias may arise when athletes
accept “hometown discounts” for unrealized reasons and then
later rationalize those contracts on the occurrence of
unanticipated events.
To illustrate, consider the varying, and potentially
competing rationales offered by John Flaherty in 1999, and
then in 2002, regarding his decision to sign a discounted
contract extension with the Tampa Devil Rays. The narrative
begins in 1999, when Flaherty weighed whether to sign a
three-year, $9 million contract extension or enter free agency.
On one hand, Flaherty could have entered free agency as one of
the premiere catchers available, and able to secure a contract
far in excess of a three-year, $9 million term.316 Moreover, at
age 31, and after a career of relatively modest earnings,
Flaherty may have viewed free agency as a singular earnings
opportunity.317 Indeed, until an unusually impressive 1999
season, Flaherty had primarily served as a back-up player who
had earned not much more than the major league minimum.318
On the other hand, Flaherty perceived subjective value
in playing on a winning team, with veteran star players, and in
a regularly sold-out home stadium.319 According to Flaherty,
315

See discussion supra pp. 1474-75.
See Marc Topkin, Flaherty Signs on for One More Hitch with Devil Rays,
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 28, 1999, at 1C. See also John Romano, Flaherty Earns
Chance with Another Team, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 20, 2002, at 1C (revealing
commentary from Devil Rays’ officials that they thought Flaherty was “selling himself
short” by agreeing to the extension, and when he did, they “congratulated themselves
on tying up an important position on the field at a reasonable salary”).
317
See Topkin, supra note 316.
318
See Bob Dick, Flaherty Becomes Big Hit, PROVIDENCE J., Aug. 6, 1996, at
1D (discussing Flaherty’s struggles); Kevin Wells, Flaherty Impressive on, off Field,
TAMPA TRIB., Nov. 30, 1997, at 11 (discussing success of Flaherty in the 1996 and
particularly 1997 seasons).
319
See Topkin, supra note 316, at 1C.
316
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those characteristics appeared associable with the Devil Rays,
as the team had recently re-signed star first baseman Fred
McGriff and had expressed interest in obtaining other star
players.320 Thus Flaherty predicted the Devil Rays would
excel.321 Indeed, Flaherty praised the “commitment” evidenced
by both Devil Rays’ management and ownership in developing
a “championship” strategy.322 Taking account of these reasons,
Flaherty found the Devil Rays’ contract offer sufficiently
attractive, and despite its sub-market value, opted to sign it.323
Unfortunately for Flaherty, the Devils Ray would not
win many games from 2000 to 2002. In fact, not only did the
Devil Rays place last in their division in each of those seasons,
but from 2001 to 2002, the team compiled the worst record of
any of the 30 major league teams.324 Moreover, despite
promises of pursuing star players, the Devil Rays featured the
Not
lowest payroll in baseball from 2000 to 2002.325
surprisingly then, the team attracted minimal fan interest, and
because of poor revenue, even encountered difficulty meeting
payroll commitments.326 In short, the subjective value Flaherty
attributed to playing on a winning team, and one with star
players and devoted fans, never materialized over the course of
his contract.
During the 2002 season—which represented the third
and final year of Flaherty’s contract—Flaherty was asked
whether he regretted signing the contract extension. After-all,
his stated reasons for accepting a “hometown” discount never
materialized. Perhaps surprisingly, Flaherty expressed no
regret.327 Instead, he inferred that upon signing the contract,
he had looked forward to serving as a mentor to young and
inexperienced players, since he anticipated that such activities
would prove valuable to him.328 Thus, Flaherty offered an
320

Id.
Id.
322
Id.
323
See Bill Chastain, Flaherty in the Fold, TAMPA TRIB., Sept. 28, 1999, at 5.
324
See Dick Scanlon, Piniella Set to Captain Devil Ray’s Shaky Ship, LEDGER
(Lakeland, Fla.), Oct. 29, 2002, at A1.
325
See Chris Anderson, Sweet Lou Is Home, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., Oct. 29,
2002, at C1.
326
See Carter Gaddis & Joe Henderson, Naimoli: Rays Won’t Miss Making
Payroll, TAMPA TRIB., May 13, 2001, at 1.
327
See Romano, supra note 316, at 1C (quoting Flaherty: “Do I regret signing
that contract? Hell no.”).
328
See Carter Gaddis, Veterans Bring Wisdom to Rays, TAMPA TRIB., Sept. 22,
2002, at 5 (quoting Flaherty: “I will look forward to the day when a winner does show
321
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entirely different subjective rationale for signing a sub-market
value contract than he had expressed in 1999. Beyond its
variance, such a rationale was likely incompatible, as seldom
do winning teams with veteran star players feature young and
inexperienced players.329
As illustrated by Flaherty, hindsight bias may distort
one’s capacity to objectively evaluate prior decision-making and
pursuit of preferences. As a result, it may impair redress of
any defects within the decision-making process, a troubling
outcome for athletes since many enter into subsequent series of
negotiations. This phenomenon is only exacerbated by regret
aversion, or the tendency among those prone to hindsight bias
to resist information concerning forgone conclusions or
hypothetical outcomes.330 Indeed, regret aversion offers further
explanation for Flaherty’s unwillingness to acknowledge regret
and for his substituted rationales: by shifting discussion from
preferable and forgone alternatives to inferior and existing
circumstances, Flaherty avoided discussion of information that
might have triggered feelings of regret and unhappiness.
Prescriptively then, while hindsight bias offered Flaherty an
alternative rationale, regret aversion offered the means by
which to discuss it.
5. Anchoring and Adjustment Effects
The failure to adjust for new information may also
impair rational-decision making among professional athletes.
As discussed in Section III, psychologists often describe this
tendency as “anchoring and adjustment” or “belief
perseverance.”331 In professional sports, athletes negotiating
contracts sometimes appear anchored to certain monetary
values, particularly when negotiations occur during market
fluctuations.
Such anchoring may not only promote
acrimonious negotiations, but also inferior outcomes.
To illustrate, consider the futile efforts of shortstop
Nomar Garciaparra and the Boston Red Sox to consummate a
contract extension during the 2003 and 2004 MLB seasons.
up out on that field and I’ll feel like in a small way . . . not that I’m part of it, but it’ll be
very gratifying to see.”).
329
See, e.g., Joe Strauss, Hitting the Road, Eyeing Direction, BALT. SUN, July
12, 2001, at 1D (discussing difficulties of winning with young and inexperienced
players).
330
See discussion supra p. 1475.
331
See discussion supra p. 1477.
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The genesis of those negotiations traces back to March 1998,
when, as second-year player, Garciaparra agreed to a five-year
contract with the Red Sox that included team options for the
2003 and 2004 seasons.332 All together, the contract offered to
pay Garciaparra $44 million between 1998 and 2004.333 At the
time, observers regarded the contract as highly generous for a
player of his experience, though its length also posed risk to
Garciaparra, particularly given the rapid growth of player
salaries in the late 1990s.334 Moreover, by enabling the Red Sox
to control his rights in the 2003 and 2004 seasons, Garciaparra
surrendered two years in which he could have elected to
become a free agent.335
By 2000, Garciaparra, Alex Rodriguez of the Seattle
Mariners, and Derek Jeter of the New York Yankees, were
widely-regarded as the three best shortstops in baseball.336
Indeed, because of their similar talent, production, and age,
they were often clustered together in baseball discussion.337
However, between the 2000 and 2001 seasons, the three would
become compensated at highly variable levels.
Indeed,
Rodriguez would sign a 10-year, $252 million free agent
contract with the Texas Rangers,338 and Jeter—who was set to
become a free agent at the end of the 2001 season—would
agree to a 10-year, $189 million contract extension with the
New York Yankees.339 In contrast, Garciaparra would remain
under contract to the Red Sox through 2004, during which time
he would earn $32 million.340 Observers immediately described
Garciaparra as wildly underpaid, because despite their similar

332
See Michael Silverman & Tony Massarotti, Nomar on the Money, BOSTON
HERALD, March 11, 1998, at 100.
333
Id.
334
See Sean McAdam, Garciaparra Gets a $23.5 Million Pact, PROVIDENCE J.BULL., Mar. 11, 1998, at 1D.
335
Id.
336
See, e.g., Larry Lage, Deivi Cruz Not Known for Control, SOUTH BEND
TRIB., Mar. 1, 2001, at B1 (describing the three best shortstops as Rodriguez, Jeter,
and Garciaparra).
337
Id.
338
See Jay Weiner, Good for A-Rod, Bad for Baseball, BUS. WEEK, Dec. 18,
2000, at 59.
339
See Brad Biggs, Millions Not Enough: Latest Contracts Have Spawned
Disgruntlement Among Stars Stuck in Long-Term Deals, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 26,
2001, at 89.
340
See Silverman & Massarotti, supra note 332, at 100.
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talent, production, and age, Rodriguez and Jeter would earn
three to four times as much.341
Unfortunately for Garciaparra, the exorbitant contracts
secured by Rodriguez and Jeter likely represented the apex of a
prior market. Indeed, the sheer size of such contracts is
thought to have triggered a backlash among MLB owners,
which subsequently diminished their willingness to spend so
unreservedly.342 Consequently, over the following two years,
free agents tended to secure significantly less lucrative
contracts than they would have previously secured.343
Undeterred by this apparent market contraction,
Garciaparra approached the Red Sox in March 2003 about a
contract extension that would pay him commensurate with
Rodriguez and Jeter.344 In fact, since the Rodriguez and Jeter
contracts paid annual average salaries of $25.2 million and
$18.9 million, respectively, Garciaparra informed the Red Sox
that he would accept no less than $17.0 million per year.345 Red
Sox management had a different idea of Garciaparra’s value,
however, reasoning that the Rodriguez and Jeter contracts no
longer represented market value for premiere shortstops.346
Indeed, as Red Sox management noted, no player, of any
position, had signed a contract paying in excess of $15 million
per season during the previous two years.347 Instead of meeting
Garciaparra’s demand, the Red Sox offered him a four-year

341
See, e.g., Jon Heyman, These Two Red Sox Are Exceptions to the Rule,
NEWSDAY (New York), Feb. 28, 2001, at A71; Bob Hohler, Martinez Extends Advice to
Duquette, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 23, 2000, at F3; Michael Silverman, Sox Cash In—Get
Off Cheap with Nomar, BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 20, 2000, at 88.
342
See Tom Haudricourt, Huge Salaries Not Trickling Down to Journeymen
Players, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 3, 2002, at 15C (describing market correction
during off season between 2001 and 2002 seasons); Mike Klis, This Time, Collusion Too
Tough to Unearth Superstar’s Big Contracts, DENVER POST, Feb. 2, 2003, at C5 (noting
sentiment among free agent players that the owners were colluding to create a market
correction during off season between 2002 and 2003 seasons).
343
Klis, supra note 342. See also Hal Bodley, 94 Strike: Lesson Learned?, USA
TODAY, Sept. 13, 2004, at 1D (noting that from 2002 to 2003, free agent salaries
declined by 3 percent).
344
See Michael Silverman, Breaking Up Is Hard to Do, SPORTING NEWS, Aug.
2, 2004, at 10 (discussing “failed contract negotiations” between Garciaparra and the
Red Sox during spring training in 2003).
345
See Jeff Horrigan, Sox Upped the Ante, BOSTON HERALD, Aug. 4, 2004, at
90; see also Tony Massarotti, Nomar: I Want to Stay, BOSTON HERALD, Dec. 8, 2003, at
120 (citing salaries for Rodriguez and Jeter).
346
See Gerry Callahan, Trade a Necessary Evil, BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 10,
2003, at B13 (noting how Red Sox team President Larry Lucchino hoped to convince
Garciaparra of the “new economic climate” in baseball (i.e., lower salaries)).
347
See Horrigan, Sox Upped the Ante, supra note 345, at 90.
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contract worth $15 million per year.348 According to Red Sox
owner John Henry, Garciaparra immediately rejected the offer,
believing that the alleged market correction was either untrue
or ephemeral.349 Garciaparra would then play the 2003 season
often appearing unhappy, and his Red Sox teammates believed
that his contract status had caused him to become increasingly
irritated.350
In November 2003, the Red Sox once again offered
Garciaparra a four-year contract, yet this time it offered an
average annual salary of only $12 million.351 In explaining the
reduction in annual value from $15 million to $12 million, Red
Sox management cited a continuing “market adjustment” that
Garciaparra
had further diminished players’ salaries.352
refused the offer, vehemently asserting that no such market
correction had occurred.353 In March 2004, the Red Sox made
one final attempt to re-sign Garciaparra, offering a four-year
contract worth $12.5 million per season, which Garciaparra
also rejected for the same reason.354 With his free agent status
looming, and with his increasingly dour attitude, the Red Sox
traded Garciaparra to the Chicago Cubs in July 2004.355 After
the 2004 season, Garciaparra finally obtained the right to
become a free agent. Such an attainment proved bittersweet,
however, as he would re-sign with the Cubs to one-year
contract worth only $8 million, or less than his “less-than-
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350
See Dan Shaughnessy, Words Don’t Do Justice for Garciaparra, BOSTON
GLOBE, July 23, 2003, at F1; see also Ken Fidlin, The Last Word, TORONTO SUN, Dec.
24, 2003, at 101 (stating Garciaparra’s disgust at being “disrespected not only by
management, but by teammates as well” following his contract squabbles);
Shaughnessy, Damaged Goods, supra note 183 (describing Garciaparra as “wildly
unhappy”); Silverman, supra note 344 (describing how Garciaparra’s “funk in mood”
was evidenced by his decision to physically separate himself from teammates during a
pivotal game against the New York Yankees, also describing Garciaparra as “ticked
off” at Red Sox management).
351
See Gordon Edes, Tales from Two Cities: Garciaparra, Sox Offer Differing
Views on Pre-Trade Events, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 2, 2004, at D1.
352
See id.
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See Jeff Horrigan, Sox in Winter Wonderland, BOSTON HERALD, Dec. 12,
2003, at 118 (noting that Garciaparra “scoffed at the offer” after the Red Sox justified it
based on the “changing financial climate in baseball”).
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See Gordon Edes, Force Play: On Trade, Henry Says Epstein Simply Did
What He Had to Do, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 4, 2004, at F1.
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market value” $9 million annual salary over the preceding four
years.356
Garciaparra’s decision to refute the existence of a
market correction, and instead anchor his value to increasingly
less-relevant contracts, proved a great disservice to him. Not
only may he have cost himself over $40 million, but, by
participating in unworkable negotiations, put himself through
needless anguish. In fact, some believe that his unwillingness
to recognize modified market conditions ultimately morphed a
happy person into a miserable one.357 Accordingly, anchoring
and adjustment effects may not only impair the pursuit of
objective value (i.e., contractual compensation) but also
equally-meaningful subjective value (i.e., level of happiness).
6. Endowment Effects
Decision-making among professional athletes may also
be influenced by endowment effects, whereby individuals
perceive more utility from their current state of affairs than
from altered, yet equivalent circumstances.358 Such phenomena
are broadly evident among those contemplating new
employment opportunities. For instance, as discussed in
Section III, employees are often less willing to pay to acquire a
right or privilege than they are willing to sell it.359
Among professional athletes, endowment effects appear
especially apparent when they re-sign at discounted rates, and
then, as a reason for accepting diminished salary, cite
employment characteristics that are likely constant among
employment options. Perhaps best evincing this idea, consider
the subjective value ascribed by some professional athletes to
the quality of their team training staffs.360 Primarily, these
staffs treat players’ injuries and provide other therapeutic

356

See Mike Kiley, Cubs’ Daily Double: Nomar, Walker, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec.
8, 2004, at 143.
357
See, e.g., Jim Donaldson, Leaving Town Was Inevitable for Embittered
Garciaparra, PROVIDENCE J., Aug. 2, 2004, at C1; Shaughnessy, Damaged Goods,
supra note 183. See generally supra note 349 and accompanying sources (providing
insight on Garciaparra’s unhappiness as a result of his futile contract negotiations with
the Red Sox).
358
See Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 105, at 802 & n.29, 803.
359
See discussion supra p. 1478.
360
See, e.g., George Vescey, Matthews Remembers Houston, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
26, 2000, at D1 (citing remarks by Bruce Matthews of the Tennessee Titans).

2006]

PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES

1525

care.361 Although they undoubtedly vary in quality, empirical
data suggests that among professional teams in the NFL, MLB,
NBA, and NHL, all include highly-skilled staff and excellent
facilities.362 In other words, any actual difference in quality
may not prove appreciable.
Some professional athletes, however, appear to place
significant subjective value in their belief that training staffs
vary widely in quality. For instance, when San Francisco
Giants’ pitcher Jason Christiansen recently re-signed to a 1year, $1 million contract—a significantly less lucrative deal
than he was offered by both the Tampa Bay Devil Rays and
New York Mets—he cited his “affection for the Giants’ training
staff” as a reason to take a hometown discount.363 Similarly,
when the Tennessee Titans re-signed offensive lineman Bruce
Matthews for less than his market value, he considered the
team’s “great training staff” as a motivating reason.364 Thus,
professional athletes may assent to substantial reductions in
salary in exchange for presumed relative benefits that might,
in practice, prove illusory.
Professional sports teams appear cognizant of these
heuristics. In fact, they often showcase their training facilities,
and attempt to impress upon players the presence of variances
among training facilities and staffs.365 Teams even construct
new facilities in part for the very purpose of keeping star
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See Cherie Black, Trainers Help Athletes Get Back on Their Feet, FLA.
TIMES-UNION, Sept. 12, 2004, at B1; see also Brian Biggane, Conditioning, Contracts
Make Age Less an Issue, PALM BEACH POST, Oct. 15, 2000, at 6B (analyzing investment
of NHL teams and players in training and fitness); Paul Hoynes, Focused on Fitness,
PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), May 31, 2005, at D1 (discussing “revolution” among
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receive); Mike Preston, Bigger, Faster, Stronger, BALT. MORNING SUN, Sept. 20, 1996
(describing extensive training available for players on the Cleveland Browns and how
other teams provide similar training); Patrick Saunders, Super Human or Super
Medicine?, DENVER POST, May 16, 2003, at D1 (describing modern diagnostic tools
available to NBA trainers and trainers in other pro sports leagues).
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See Henry Schulman, Giants Re-Sign Left-Hander, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 18,
2004, at D3. It should be noted that Christiansen cited additional subjective reasons
for his decision to stay in San Francisco, including his relationship with teammates
and the geographic location of the team’s training facilities. Id.
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See Vescey, supra note 360, at D1.
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See Mike O’Hara, New Digs Are “Unbelievable,” DETROIT NEWS, Mar. 31,
2002, at 8D (noting this effect in the NFL); Bob Wolfley, July Has Become Courting
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players, as well as attracting free agents.366 These efforts are
encouraged by team employees, including those players who
regard training facilities and staff as crucial to their
performance.367
Team manipulation of preferences among professional
athletes highlights the malleability of employment choice.
Indeed, by promoting the perception of greater utility from
current states of affair than from functionally-equivalent
states, teams exacerbate endowment effects among their
players. Such a phenomenon further amplifies the presence of
cognitive biases and heuristics among professional athletes,
and thus further suggests non-optimal pursuits of preferences.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In contemplation of employment opportunities,
professional athletes appear to embrace a myriad mixture of
preferences, and such preferences frequently reflect the
placement of considerable value in non-monetary goals.
Accordingly, for many professional athletes, “optimality” does
not reflect greed, avarice, or other commonly-held assumptions
about those individuals; instead, it often comprises intangible,
even romanticized inclinations, such as loyalty, camaraderie,
and aspiration for team success. For that reason, and upon
deeper reflection, behavioral patterns among contemporary
professional athletes may not only “remind us of all that was
once good” in professional sports368—they may also suggest that
such good never left.
An analysis limited to preferences, however, ignores the
presence of cognitive biases and heuristics among professional
athletes.
Significantly, such influences may distort
preferences, and yield sub-optimal decision-making. This is
especially apparent when professional sports teams impress
illusory variances among themselves and other teams.
366
See, e.g., Matt Winkeljohn, New Facility an All-Around Improvement,
ATLANTA CONST., Aug. 9, 2000, at E6 (describing thought-process among Atlanta
Falcons’ management officials when contemplating the construction of a new training
facility).
367
See Mike Cobb, Planned Facility Has Bucs Smiling, LEDGER (Florida),
Mar. 18, 2004, at C3 (citing remarks by Tampa Bay Buccaneers wide receiver Joe
Jurevicius).
368
FIELD OF DREAMS (Universal 1989). This particular comment refers to the
belief that professional athletes from the early part of the twentieth century cared
substantially more about winning games and less about financial remuneration than
do contemporary athletes.
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Consequently, professional athletes may unknowingly
misinterpret their preferences, thereby triggering diminutions
in both objective value and subjective value.
The conclusions reached in this Article may prove both
novel and complimentary. Indeed, they reflect the first of their
kind.
Such novelty may offer meaningful insight to
professional athletes, their representatives, and teams, a group
collectively worth billions of dollars. For professional athletes,
knowledge of cognitive biases and heuristics in their decisionmaking may encourage ameliorative cognitive adjustments.
For instance, instead of discounting or ignoring information
that challenges existing assumptions about their teams,
professional athletes might explore the validity and salience of
such information and determine whether to utilize it in their
decision-making process. Similarly, rather than assuming that
established precedents, such as probable performance metrics,
do not apply with equal force to themselves, professional
athletes might instead pursue more expansive consultations.
By doing so, they might refrain from assenting to poor risk
contracts, particularly those that are incentive-based or
otherwise unconventionally-constructed.
Player representatives may likewise infer strategic
guidance from these conclusions. If anything, their role
appears bolstered by the presence of cognitive distortions
among professional athletes. Indeed, player representatives
may offer objective advice, and because of the intimacy of the
player-agent relationship, may do so in uniquely compelling
ways. Alternatively, player representatives may become more
attune to subjective preferences among players. Although
adherence to such preferences might diminish agent
compensation, the quality of representation would rise
commensurate with preference maximization. Of course, with
any enlarged role for player representatives comes heightened
responsibility, as well as the corresponding need to avoid
cognitive biases in representation.
Consider also the capacity of professional sports teams
to adroitly manipulate cognitive biases, and how that capacity
only amplifies the desirability of professional athletes and their
representatives to respond accordingly. As discussed in this
Article, teams routinely engage in machinations to distort the
decision-making of professional athletes. Moreover, teams’
continued choice to do so supplies further evidence of cognitive
biases, as otherwise, they would presumably pursue other
recruiting and retention strategies. Accordingly, an enriched
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ability on the part of players and their representatives to
counteract cognitive biases would presumably deter such
behavior or make it more costly.
Yet perhaps most engagingly, the conclusions reached in
this Article illuminate the potential for behavioral sciences to
influence traditional law and economics, as well as theories of
contract formation. This is especially true since, unlike other
population groups that frequently capture the attention of legal
academics, professional athletes spontaneously furnish
publishable commentary of their values, beliefs, and priorities,
and they do so in real world, rather than experimental settings.
Indeed, by escaping the alleged “experimental flaw” of many
behavioral law and economic studies, professional athletes offer
a uniquely appealing group for further examination. For that
reason, recognition of how professional athletes respond to
subjective stimuli, as well as cognitive distortions, may reveal
as much about us as it does about them.

